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authorAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>2007-07-22 08:04:18 -0400
committerAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>2007-10-21 02:37:45 -0400
commit74c3cbe33bc077ac1159cadfea608b501e100344 (patch)
tree4c4023caa4e15d19780255fa5880df3d36eb292c /kernel/auditfilter.c
parent455434d450a358ac5bcf3fc58f8913d13c544622 (diff)
[PATCH] audit: watching subtrees
New kind of audit rule predicates: "object is visible in given subtree". The part that can be sanely implemented, that is. Limitations: * if you have hardlink from outside of tree, you'd better watch it too (or just watch the object itself, obviously) * if you mount something under a watched tree, tell audit that new chunk should be added to watched subtrees * if you umount something in a watched tree and it's still mounted elsewhere, you will get matches on events happening there. New command tells audit to recalculate the trees, trimming such sources of false positives. Note that it's _not_ about path - if something mounted in several places (multiple mount, bindings, different namespaces, etc.), the match does _not_ depend on which one we are using for access. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/auditfilter.c')
-rw-r--r--kernel/auditfilter.c64
1 files changed, 57 insertions, 7 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index df66a21fb360..5d96f2cc7be8 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ struct list_head audit_filter_list[AUDIT_NR_FILTERS] = {
#endif
};
-static DEFINE_MUTEX(audit_filter_mutex);
+DEFINE_MUTEX(audit_filter_mutex);
/* Inotify handle */
extern struct inotify_handle *audit_ih;
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ static inline void audit_free_rule(struct audit_entry *e)
kfree(e);
}
-static inline void audit_free_rule_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
+void audit_free_rule_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
{
struct audit_entry *e = container_of(head, struct audit_entry, rcu);
audit_free_rule(e);
@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ static inline struct audit_entry *audit_init_entry(u32 field_count)
/* Unpack a filter field's string representation from user-space
* buffer. */
-static char *audit_unpack_string(void **bufp, size_t *remain, size_t len)
+char *audit_unpack_string(void **bufp, size_t *remain, size_t len)
{
char *str;
@@ -247,7 +247,7 @@ static inline int audit_to_inode(struct audit_krule *krule,
struct audit_field *f)
{
if (krule->listnr != AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT ||
- krule->watch || krule->inode_f)
+ krule->watch || krule->inode_f || krule->tree)
return -EINVAL;
krule->inode_f = f;
@@ -266,7 +266,7 @@ static int audit_to_watch(struct audit_krule *krule, char *path, int len,
if (path[0] != '/' || path[len-1] == '/' ||
krule->listnr != AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT ||
op & ~AUDIT_EQUAL ||
- krule->inode_f || krule->watch) /* 1 inode # per rule, for hash */
+ krule->inode_f || krule->watch || krule->tree)
return -EINVAL;
watch = audit_init_watch(path);
@@ -622,6 +622,17 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data,
goto exit_free;
}
break;
+ case AUDIT_DIR:
+ str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val);
+ if (IS_ERR(str))
+ goto exit_free;
+ entry->rule.buflen += f->val;
+
+ err = audit_make_tree(&entry->rule, str, f->op);
+ kfree(str);
+ if (err)
+ goto exit_free;
+ break;
case AUDIT_INODE:
err = audit_to_inode(&entry->rule, f);
if (err)
@@ -668,7 +679,7 @@ exit_free:
}
/* Pack a filter field's string representation into data block. */
-static inline size_t audit_pack_string(void **bufp, char *str)
+static inline size_t audit_pack_string(void **bufp, const char *str)
{
size_t len = strlen(str);
@@ -747,6 +758,11 @@ static struct audit_rule_data *audit_krule_to_data(struct audit_krule *krule)
data->buflen += data->values[i] =
audit_pack_string(&bufp, krule->watch->path);
break;
+ case AUDIT_DIR:
+ data->buflen += data->values[i] =
+ audit_pack_string(&bufp,
+ audit_tree_path(krule->tree));
+ break;
case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
data->buflen += data->values[i] =
audit_pack_string(&bufp, krule->filterkey);
@@ -795,6 +811,11 @@ static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_krule *a, struct audit_krule *b)
if (strcmp(a->watch->path, b->watch->path))
return 1;
break;
+ case AUDIT_DIR:
+ if (strcmp(audit_tree_path(a->tree),
+ audit_tree_path(b->tree)))
+ return 1;
+ break;
case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
/* both filterkeys exist based on above type compare */
if (strcmp(a->filterkey, b->filterkey))
@@ -897,6 +918,14 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_dupe_rule(struct audit_krule *old,
new->inode_f = old->inode_f;
new->watch = NULL;
new->field_count = old->field_count;
+ /*
+ * note that we are OK with not refcounting here; audit_match_tree()
+ * never dereferences tree and we can't get false positives there
+ * since we'd have to have rule gone from the list *and* removed
+ * before the chunks found by lookup had been allocated, i.e. before
+ * the beginning of list scan.
+ */
+ new->tree = old->tree;
memcpy(new->fields, old->fields, sizeof(struct audit_field) * fcount);
/* deep copy this information, updating the se_rule fields, because
@@ -1217,6 +1246,7 @@ static inline int audit_add_rule(struct audit_entry *entry,
struct audit_entry *e;
struct audit_field *inode_f = entry->rule.inode_f;
struct audit_watch *watch = entry->rule.watch;
+ struct audit_tree *tree = entry->rule.tree;
struct nameidata *ndp = NULL, *ndw = NULL;
int h, err;
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
@@ -1238,6 +1268,9 @@ static inline int audit_add_rule(struct audit_entry *entry,
mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex);
if (e) {
err = -EEXIST;
+ /* normally audit_add_tree_rule() will free it on failure */
+ if (tree)
+ audit_put_tree(tree);
goto error;
}
@@ -1259,6 +1292,13 @@ static inline int audit_add_rule(struct audit_entry *entry,
h = audit_hash_ino((u32)watch->ino);
list = &audit_inode_hash[h];
}
+ if (tree) {
+ err = audit_add_tree_rule(&entry->rule);
+ if (err) {
+ mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex);
+ goto error;
+ }
+ }
if (entry->rule.flags & AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND) {
list_add_rcu(&entry->list, list);
@@ -1292,6 +1332,7 @@ static inline int audit_del_rule(struct audit_entry *entry,
struct audit_entry *e;
struct audit_field *inode_f = entry->rule.inode_f;
struct audit_watch *watch, *tmp_watch = entry->rule.watch;
+ struct audit_tree *tree = entry->rule.tree;
LIST_HEAD(inotify_list);
int h, ret = 0;
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
@@ -1336,6 +1377,9 @@ static inline int audit_del_rule(struct audit_entry *entry,
}
}
+ if (e->rule.tree)
+ audit_remove_tree_rule(&e->rule);
+
list_del_rcu(&e->list);
call_rcu(&e->rcu, audit_free_rule_rcu);
@@ -1354,6 +1398,8 @@ static inline int audit_del_rule(struct audit_entry *entry,
out:
if (tmp_watch)
audit_put_watch(tmp_watch); /* match initial get */
+ if (tree)
+ audit_put_tree(tree); /* that's the temporary one */
return ret;
}
@@ -1737,6 +1783,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_update(void)
{
struct audit_entry *entry, *n, *nentry;
struct audit_watch *watch;
+ struct audit_tree *tree;
int i, err = 0;
/* audit_filter_mutex synchronizes the writers */
@@ -1748,6 +1795,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_update(void)
continue;
watch = entry->rule.watch;
+ tree = entry->rule.tree;
nentry = audit_dupe_rule(&entry->rule, watch);
if (unlikely(IS_ERR(nentry))) {
/* save the first error encountered for the
@@ -1763,7 +1811,9 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_update(void)
list_add(&nentry->rule.rlist,
&watch->rules);
list_del(&entry->rule.rlist);
- }
+ } else if (tree)
+ list_replace_init(&entry->rule.rlist,
+ &nentry->rule.rlist);
list_replace_rcu(&entry->list, &nentry->list);
}
call_rcu(&entry->rcu, audit_free_rule_rcu);

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