path: root/kernel/auditfilter.c
diff options
authorKlaus Weidner <klaus@atsec.com>2007-05-16 17:45:42 -0500
committerAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>2007-07-22 09:57:02 -0400
commitc926e4f432af0f61ac2b9b637fb51a4871a3fc91 (patch)
tree732a5e76f2405ed84915997b59f8bad921d7ac04 /kernel/auditfilter.c
parent5b9a4262232d632c28990fcdf4f36d0e0ade5f18 (diff)
[PATCH] audit: fix broken class-based syscall audit
The sanity check in audit_match_class() is wrong. We are able to audit 2048 syscalls but in audit_match_class() we were accidentally using sizeof(_u32) instead of number of bits in _u32 when deciding how many syscalls were valid. On ia64 in particular we were hitting syscall numbers over the (wrong) limit of 256. Fixing the audit_match_class check takes care of the problem. Signed-off-by: Klaus Weidner <klaus@atsec.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/auditfilter.c')
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index 1bf093dcffe0..0ea96bab91cc 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -304,7 +304,7 @@ int __init audit_register_class(int class, unsigned *list)
int audit_match_class(int class, unsigned syscall)
- if (unlikely(syscall >= AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE * sizeof(__u32)))
+ if (unlikely(syscall >= AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE * 32))
return 0;
if (unlikely(class >= AUDIT_SYSCALL_CLASSES || !classes[class]))
return 0;

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