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authorAmy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com>2006-04-07 16:55:56 -0400
committerAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>2006-06-20 05:25:27 -0400
commitf368c07d7214a7c41dfceb76c8db473b850f0229 (patch)
treee3f1e2d1a6ffbe61bf99ece51b906654728db4c9 /kernel/auditsc.c
parent20ca73bc792be9625af184cbec36e1372611d1c3 (diff)
[PATCH] audit: path-based rules
In this implementation, audit registers inotify watches on the parent directories of paths specified in audit rules. When audit's inotify event handler is called, it updates any affected rules based on the filesystem event. If the parent directory is renamed, removed, or its filesystem is unmounted, audit removes all rules referencing that inotify watch. To keep things simple, this implementation limits location-based auditing to the directory entries in an existing directory. Given a path-based rule for /foo/bar/passwd, the following table applies: passwd modified -- audit event logged passwd replaced -- audit event logged, rules list updated bar renamed -- rule removed foo renamed -- untracked, meaning that the rule now applies to the new location Audit users typically want to have many rules referencing filesystem objects, which can significantly impact filtering performance. This patch also adds an inode-number-based rule hash to mitigate this situation. The patch is relative to the audit git tree: http://kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/viro/audit-current.git;a=summary and uses the inotify kernel API: http://lkml.org/lkml/2006/6/1/145 Signed-off-by: Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/auditsc.c')
-rw-r--r--kernel/auditsc.c124
1 files changed, 88 insertions, 36 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 14e295a4121b..174a3f624892 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -200,12 +200,13 @@ struct audit_context {
#endif
};
-
+/* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */
/* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0
* otherwise. */
static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
struct audit_krule *rule,
struct audit_context *ctx,
+ struct audit_names *name,
enum audit_state *state)
{
int i, j, need_sid = 1;
@@ -268,7 +269,10 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
}
break;
case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR:
- if (ctx) {
+ if (name)
+ result = audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->dev),
+ f->op, f->val);
+ else if (ctx) {
for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(ctx->names[j].dev), f->op, f->val)) {
++result;
@@ -278,7 +282,10 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
}
break;
case AUDIT_DEVMINOR:
- if (ctx) {
+ if (name)
+ result = audit_comparator(MINOR(name->dev),
+ f->op, f->val);
+ else if (ctx) {
for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
if (audit_comparator(MINOR(ctx->names[j].dev), f->op, f->val)) {
++result;
@@ -288,7 +295,10 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
}
break;
case AUDIT_INODE:
- if (ctx) {
+ if (name)
+ result = (name->ino == f->val ||
+ name->pino == f->val);
+ else if (ctx) {
for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
if (audit_comparator(ctx->names[j].ino, f->op, f->val) ||
audit_comparator(ctx->names[j].pino, f->op, f->val)) {
@@ -298,6 +308,12 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
}
}
break;
+ case AUDIT_WATCH:
+ if (name && rule->watch->ino != (unsigned long)-1)
+ result = (name->dev == rule->watch->dev &&
+ (name->ino == rule->watch->ino ||
+ name->pino == rule->watch->ino));
+ break;
case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
result = 0;
if (ctx)
@@ -354,7 +370,7 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk)
rcu_read_lock();
list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) {
- if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, &state)) {
+ if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, NULL, &state)) {
rcu_read_unlock();
return state;
}
@@ -384,8 +400,9 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
- if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit
- && audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, &state)) {
+ if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
+ audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL,
+ &state)) {
rcu_read_unlock();
return state;
}
@@ -395,6 +412,49 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
}
+/* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if any audit_names[] have been
+ * collected during syscall processing. We only check rules in sublists at hash
+ * buckets applicable to the inode numbers in audit_names[].
+ * Regarding audit_state, same rules apply as for audit_filter_syscall().
+ */
+enum audit_state audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk,
+ struct audit_context *ctx)
+{
+ int i;
+ struct audit_entry *e;
+ enum audit_state state;
+
+ if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid)
+ return AUDIT_DISABLED;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ for (i = 0; i < ctx->name_count; i++) {
+ int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
+ int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
+ struct audit_names *n = &ctx->names[i];
+ int h = audit_hash_ino((u32)n->ino);
+ struct list_head *list = &audit_inode_hash[h];
+
+ if (list_empty(list))
+ continue;
+
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
+ if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
+ audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state)) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return state;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
+}
+
+void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context *ctx)
+{
+ ctx->auditable = 1;
+}
+
static inline struct audit_context *audit_get_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
int return_valid,
int return_code)
@@ -408,11 +468,20 @@ static inline struct audit_context *audit_get_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
if (context->in_syscall && !context->auditable) {
enum audit_state state;
+
state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]);
+ if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) {
+ context->auditable = 1;
+ goto get_context;
+ }
+
+ state = audit_filter_inodes(tsk, context);
if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
context->auditable = 1;
+
}
+get_context:
context->pid = tsk->pid;
context->ppid = sys_getppid(); /* sic. tsk == current in all cases */
context->uid = tsk->uid;
@@ -1142,37 +1211,20 @@ void __audit_inode_child(const char *dname, const struct inode *inode,
return;
/* determine matching parent */
- if (dname)
- for (idx = 0; idx < context->name_count; idx++)
- if (context->names[idx].pino == pino) {
- const char *n;
- const char *name = context->names[idx].name;
- int dlen = strlen(dname);
- int nlen = name ? strlen(name) : 0;
-
- if (nlen < dlen)
- continue;
-
- /* disregard trailing slashes */
- n = name + nlen - 1;
- while ((*n == '/') && (n > name))
- n--;
-
- /* find last path component */
- n = n - dlen + 1;
- if (n < name)
- continue;
- else if (n > name) {
- if (*--n != '/')
- continue;
- else
- n++;
- }
+ if (!dname)
+ goto no_match;
+ for (idx = 0; idx < context->name_count; idx++)
+ if (context->names[idx].pino == pino) {
+ const char *name = context->names[idx].name;
- if (strncmp(n, dname, dlen) == 0)
- goto update_context;
- }
+ if (!name)
+ continue;
+
+ if (audit_compare_dname_path(dname, name) == 0)
+ goto update_context;
+ }
+no_match:
/* catch-all in case match not found */
idx = context->name_count++;
context->names[idx].name = NULL;

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