aboutsummaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/security/selinux/ss/services.c
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@ppc970.osdl.org>2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@ppc970.osdl.org>2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700
commit1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 (patch)
tree0bba044c4ce775e45a88a51686b5d9f90697ea9d /security/selinux/ss/services.c
Linux-2.6.12-rc2v2.6.12-rc2
Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
Diffstat (limited to 'security/selinux/ss/services.c')
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/services.c1777
1 files changed, 1777 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..5a820cf88c9c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1777 @@
+/*
+ * Implementation of the security services.
+ *
+ * Authors : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *
+ * Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
+ *
+ * Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure.
+ *
+ * Updated: Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com> and Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
+ *
+ * Added conditional policy language extensions
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004 Tresys Technology, LLC
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation, version 2.
+ */
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/in.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <asm/semaphore.h>
+#include "flask.h"
+#include "avc.h"
+#include "avc_ss.h"
+#include "security.h"
+#include "context.h"
+#include "policydb.h"
+#include "sidtab.h"
+#include "services.h"
+#include "conditional.h"
+#include "mls.h"
+
+extern void selnl_notify_policyload(u32 seqno);
+unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
+
+static DEFINE_RWLOCK(policy_rwlock);
+#define POLICY_RDLOCK read_lock(&policy_rwlock)
+#define POLICY_WRLOCK write_lock_irq(&policy_rwlock)
+#define POLICY_RDUNLOCK read_unlock(&policy_rwlock)
+#define POLICY_WRUNLOCK write_unlock_irq(&policy_rwlock)
+
+static DECLARE_MUTEX(load_sem);
+#define LOAD_LOCK down(&load_sem)
+#define LOAD_UNLOCK up(&load_sem)
+
+static struct sidtab sidtab;
+struct policydb policydb;
+int ss_initialized = 0;
+
+/*
+ * The largest sequence number that has been used when
+ * providing an access decision to the access vector cache.
+ * The sequence number only changes when a policy change
+ * occurs.
+ */
+static u32 latest_granting = 0;
+
+/* Forward declaration. */
+static int context_struct_to_string(struct context *context, char **scontext,
+ u32 *scontext_len);
+
+/*
+ * Return the boolean value of a constraint expression
+ * when it is applied to the specified source and target
+ * security contexts.
+ *
+ * xcontext is a special beast... It is used by the validatetrans rules
+ * only. For these rules, scontext is the context before the transition,
+ * tcontext is the context after the transition, and xcontext is the context
+ * of the process performing the transition. All other callers of
+ * constraint_expr_eval should pass in NULL for xcontext.
+ */
+static int constraint_expr_eval(struct context *scontext,
+ struct context *tcontext,
+ struct context *xcontext,
+ struct constraint_expr *cexpr)
+{
+ u32 val1, val2;
+ struct context *c;
+ struct role_datum *r1, *r2;
+ struct mls_level *l1, *l2;
+ struct constraint_expr *e;
+ int s[CEXPR_MAXDEPTH];
+ int sp = -1;
+
+ for (e = cexpr; e; e = e->next) {
+ switch (e->expr_type) {
+ case CEXPR_NOT:
+ BUG_ON(sp < 0);
+ s[sp] = !s[sp];
+ break;
+ case CEXPR_AND:
+ BUG_ON(sp < 1);
+ sp--;
+ s[sp] &= s[sp+1];
+ break;
+ case CEXPR_OR:
+ BUG_ON(sp < 1);
+ sp--;
+ s[sp] |= s[sp+1];
+ break;
+ case CEXPR_ATTR:
+ if (sp == (CEXPR_MAXDEPTH-1))
+ return 0;
+ switch (e->attr) {
+ case CEXPR_USER:
+ val1 = scontext->user;
+ val2 = tcontext->user;
+ break;
+ case CEXPR_TYPE:
+ val1 = scontext->type;
+ val2 = tcontext->type;
+ break;
+ case CEXPR_ROLE:
+ val1 = scontext->role;
+ val2 = tcontext->role;
+ r1 = policydb.role_val_to_struct[val1 - 1];
+ r2 = policydb.role_val_to_struct[val2 - 1];
+ switch (e->op) {
+ case CEXPR_DOM:
+ s[++sp] = ebitmap_get_bit(&r1->dominates,
+ val2 - 1);
+ continue;
+ case CEXPR_DOMBY:
+ s[++sp] = ebitmap_get_bit(&r2->dominates,
+ val1 - 1);
+ continue;
+ case CEXPR_INCOMP:
+ s[++sp] = ( !ebitmap_get_bit(&r1->dominates,
+ val2 - 1) &&
+ !ebitmap_get_bit(&r2->dominates,
+ val1 - 1) );
+ continue;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ break;
+ case CEXPR_L1L2:
+ l1 = &(scontext->range.level[0]);
+ l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[0]);
+ goto mls_ops;
+ case CEXPR_L1H2:
+ l1 = &(scontext->range.level[0]);
+ l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[1]);
+ goto mls_ops;
+ case CEXPR_H1L2:
+ l1 = &(scontext->range.level[1]);
+ l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[0]);
+ goto mls_ops;
+ case CEXPR_H1H2:
+ l1 = &(scontext->range.level[1]);
+ l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[1]);
+ goto mls_ops;
+ case CEXPR_L1H1:
+ l1 = &(scontext->range.level[0]);
+ l2 = &(scontext->range.level[1]);
+ goto mls_ops;
+ case CEXPR_L2H2:
+ l1 = &(tcontext->range.level[0]);
+ l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[1]);
+ goto mls_ops;
+mls_ops:
+ switch (e->op) {
+ case CEXPR_EQ:
+ s[++sp] = mls_level_eq(l1, l2);
+ continue;
+ case CEXPR_NEQ:
+ s[++sp] = !mls_level_eq(l1, l2);
+ continue;
+ case CEXPR_DOM:
+ s[++sp] = mls_level_dom(l1, l2);
+ continue;
+ case CEXPR_DOMBY:
+ s[++sp] = mls_level_dom(l2, l1);
+ continue;
+ case CEXPR_INCOMP:
+ s[++sp] = mls_level_incomp(l2, l1);
+ continue;
+ default:
+ BUG();
+ return 0;
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ BUG();
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ switch (e->op) {
+ case CEXPR_EQ:
+ s[++sp] = (val1 == val2);
+ break;
+ case CEXPR_NEQ:
+ s[++sp] = (val1 != val2);
+ break;
+ default:
+ BUG();
+ return 0;
+ }
+ break;
+ case CEXPR_NAMES:
+ if (sp == (CEXPR_MAXDEPTH-1))
+ return 0;
+ c = scontext;
+ if (e->attr & CEXPR_TARGET)
+ c = tcontext;
+ else if (e->attr & CEXPR_XTARGET) {
+ c = xcontext;
+ if (!c) {
+ BUG();
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ if (e->attr & CEXPR_USER)
+ val1 = c->user;
+ else if (e->attr & CEXPR_ROLE)
+ val1 = c->role;
+ else if (e->attr & CEXPR_TYPE)
+ val1 = c->type;
+ else {
+ BUG();
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ switch (e->op) {
+ case CEXPR_EQ:
+ s[++sp] = ebitmap_get_bit(&e->names, val1 - 1);
+ break;
+ case CEXPR_NEQ:
+ s[++sp] = !ebitmap_get_bit(&e->names, val1 - 1);
+ break;
+ default:
+ BUG();
+ return 0;
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ BUG();
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ BUG_ON(sp != 0);
+ return s[0];
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compute access vectors based on a context structure pair for
+ * the permissions in a particular class.
+ */
+static int context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
+ struct context *tcontext,
+ u16 tclass,
+ u32 requested,
+ struct av_decision *avd)
+{
+ struct constraint_node *constraint;
+ struct role_allow *ra;
+ struct avtab_key avkey;
+ struct avtab_datum *avdatum;
+ struct class_datum *tclass_datum;
+
+ /*
+ * Remap extended Netlink classes for old policy versions.
+ * Do this here rather than socket_type_to_security_class()
+ * in case a newer policy version is loaded, allowing sockets
+ * to remain in the correct class.
+ */
+ if (policydb_loaded_version < POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
+ if (tclass >= SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET &&
+ tclass <= SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET)
+ tclass = SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
+
+ if (!tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security_compute_av: unrecognized class %d\n",
+ tclass);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ tclass_datum = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
+
+ /*
+ * Initialize the access vectors to the default values.
+ */
+ avd->allowed = 0;
+ avd->decided = 0xffffffff;
+ avd->auditallow = 0;
+ avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff;
+ avd->seqno = latest_granting;
+
+ /*
+ * If a specific type enforcement rule was defined for
+ * this permission check, then use it.
+ */
+ avkey.source_type = scontext->type;
+ avkey.target_type = tcontext->type;
+ avkey.target_class = tclass;
+ avdatum = avtab_search(&policydb.te_avtab, &avkey, AVTAB_AV);
+ if (avdatum) {
+ if (avdatum->specified & AVTAB_ALLOWED)
+ avd->allowed = avtab_allowed(avdatum);
+ if (avdatum->specified & AVTAB_AUDITDENY)
+ avd->auditdeny = avtab_auditdeny(avdatum);
+ if (avdatum->specified & AVTAB_AUDITALLOW)
+ avd->auditallow = avtab_auditallow(avdatum);
+ }
+
+ /* Check conditional av table for additional permissions */
+ cond_compute_av(&policydb.te_cond_avtab, &avkey, avd);
+
+ /*
+ * Remove any permissions prohibited by a constraint (this includes
+ * the MLS policy).
+ */
+ constraint = tclass_datum->constraints;
+ while (constraint) {
+ if ((constraint->permissions & (avd->allowed)) &&
+ !constraint_expr_eval(scontext, tcontext, NULL,
+ constraint->expr)) {
+ avd->allowed = (avd->allowed) & ~(constraint->permissions);
+ }
+ constraint = constraint->next;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If checking process transition permission and the
+ * role is changing, then check the (current_role, new_role)
+ * pair.
+ */
+ if (tclass == SECCLASS_PROCESS &&
+ (avd->allowed & (PROCESS__TRANSITION | PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION)) &&
+ scontext->role != tcontext->role) {
+ for (ra = policydb.role_allow; ra; ra = ra->next) {
+ if (scontext->role == ra->role &&
+ tcontext->role == ra->new_role)
+ break;
+ }
+ if (!ra)
+ avd->allowed = (avd->allowed) & ~(PROCESS__TRANSITION |
+ PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int security_validtrans_handle_fail(struct context *ocontext,
+ struct context *ncontext,
+ struct context *tcontext,
+ u16 tclass)
+{
+ char *o = NULL, *n = NULL, *t = NULL;
+ u32 olen, nlen, tlen;
+
+ if (context_struct_to_string(ocontext, &o, &olen) < 0)
+ goto out;
+ if (context_struct_to_string(ncontext, &n, &nlen) < 0)
+ goto out;
+ if (context_struct_to_string(tcontext, &t, &tlen) < 0)
+ goto out;
+ audit_log(current->audit_context,
+ "security_validate_transition: denied for"
+ " oldcontext=%s newcontext=%s taskcontext=%s tclass=%s",
+ o, n, t, policydb.p_class_val_to_name[tclass-1]);
+out:
+ kfree(o);
+ kfree(n);
+ kfree(t);
+
+ if (!selinux_enforcing)
+ return 0;
+ return -EPERM;
+}
+
+int security_validate_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
+ u16 tclass)
+{
+ struct context *ocontext;
+ struct context *ncontext;
+ struct context *tcontext;
+ struct class_datum *tclass_datum;
+ struct constraint_node *constraint;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ if (!ss_initialized)
+ return 0;
+
+ POLICY_RDLOCK;
+
+ /*
+ * Remap extended Netlink classes for old policy versions.
+ * Do this here rather than socket_type_to_security_class()
+ * in case a newer policy version is loaded, allowing sockets
+ * to remain in the correct class.
+ */
+ if (policydb_loaded_version < POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
+ if (tclass >= SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET &&
+ tclass <= SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET)
+ tclass = SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
+
+ if (!tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security_validate_transition: "
+ "unrecognized class %d\n", tclass);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ tclass_datum = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
+
+ ocontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, oldsid);
+ if (!ocontext) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security_validate_transition: "
+ " unrecognized SID %d\n", oldsid);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ncontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, newsid);
+ if (!ncontext) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security_validate_transition: "
+ " unrecognized SID %d\n", newsid);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tasksid);
+ if (!tcontext) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security_validate_transition: "
+ " unrecognized SID %d\n", tasksid);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ constraint = tclass_datum->validatetrans;
+ while (constraint) {
+ if (!constraint_expr_eval(ocontext, ncontext, tcontext,
+ constraint->expr)) {
+ rc = security_validtrans_handle_fail(ocontext, ncontext,
+ tcontext, tclass);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ constraint = constraint->next;
+ }
+
+out:
+ POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_compute_av - Compute access vector decisions.
+ * @ssid: source security identifier
+ * @tsid: target security identifier
+ * @tclass: target security class
+ * @requested: requested permissions
+ * @avd: access vector decisions
+ *
+ * Compute a set of access vector decisions based on the
+ * SID pair (@ssid, @tsid) for the permissions in @tclass.
+ * Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid or %0
+ * if the access vector decisions were computed successfully.
+ */
+int security_compute_av(u32 ssid,
+ u32 tsid,
+ u16 tclass,
+ u32 requested,
+ struct av_decision *avd)
+{
+ struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ if (!ss_initialized) {
+ avd->allowed = requested;
+ avd->decided = requested;
+ avd->auditallow = 0;
+ avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff;
+ avd->seqno = latest_granting;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ POLICY_RDLOCK;
+
+ scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid);
+ if (!scontext) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security_compute_av: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ ssid);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tsid);
+ if (!tcontext) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security_compute_av: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ tsid);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ rc = context_struct_compute_av(scontext, tcontext, tclass,
+ requested, avd);
+out:
+ POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Write the security context string representation of
+ * the context structure `context' into a dynamically
+ * allocated string of the correct size. Set `*scontext'
+ * to point to this string and set `*scontext_len' to
+ * the length of the string.
+ */
+static int context_struct_to_string(struct context *context, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
+{
+ char *scontextp;
+
+ *scontext = NULL;
+ *scontext_len = 0;
+
+ /* Compute the size of the context. */
+ *scontext_len += strlen(policydb.p_user_val_to_name[context->user - 1]) + 1;
+ *scontext_len += strlen(policydb.p_role_val_to_name[context->role - 1]) + 1;
+ *scontext_len += strlen(policydb.p_type_val_to_name[context->type - 1]) + 1;
+ *scontext_len += mls_compute_context_len(context);
+
+ /* Allocate space for the context; caller must free this space. */
+ scontextp = kmalloc(*scontext_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!scontextp) {
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ *scontext = scontextp;
+
+ /*
+ * Copy the user name, role name and type name into the context.
+ */
+ sprintf(scontextp, "%s:%s:%s",
+ policydb.p_user_val_to_name[context->user - 1],
+ policydb.p_role_val_to_name[context->role - 1],
+ policydb.p_type_val_to_name[context->type - 1]);
+ scontextp += strlen(policydb.p_user_val_to_name[context->user - 1]) +
+ 1 + strlen(policydb.p_role_val_to_name[context->role - 1]) +
+ 1 + strlen(policydb.p_type_val_to_name[context->type - 1]);
+
+ mls_sid_to_context(context, &scontextp);
+
+ *scontextp = 0;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#include "initial_sid_to_string.h"
+
+/**
+ * security_sid_to_context - Obtain a context for a given SID.
+ * @sid: security identifier, SID
+ * @scontext: security context
+ * @scontext_len: length in bytes
+ *
+ * Write the string representation of the context associated with @sid
+ * into a dynamically allocated string of the correct size. Set @scontext
+ * to point to this string and set @scontext_len to the length of the string.
+ */
+int security_sid_to_context(u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
+{
+ struct context *context;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ if (!ss_initialized) {
+ if (sid <= SECINITSID_NUM) {
+ char *scontextp;
+
+ *scontext_len = strlen(initial_sid_to_string[sid]) + 1;
+ scontextp = kmalloc(*scontext_len,GFP_ATOMIC);
+ strcpy(scontextp, initial_sid_to_string[sid]);
+ *scontext = scontextp;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security_sid_to_context: called before initial "
+ "load_policy on unknown SID %d\n", sid);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ POLICY_RDLOCK;
+ context = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
+ if (!context) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security_sid_to_context: unrecognized SID "
+ "%d\n", sid);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+ rc = context_struct_to_string(context, scontext, scontext_len);
+out_unlock:
+ POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+out:
+ return rc;
+
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_context_to_sid - Obtain a SID for a given security context.
+ * @scontext: security context
+ * @scontext_len: length in bytes
+ * @sid: security identifier, SID
+ *
+ * Obtains a SID associated with the security context that
+ * has the string representation specified by @scontext.
+ * Returns -%EINVAL if the context is invalid, -%ENOMEM if insufficient
+ * memory is available, or 0 on success.
+ */
+int security_context_to_sid(char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *sid)
+{
+ char *scontext2;
+ struct context context;
+ struct role_datum *role;
+ struct type_datum *typdatum;
+ struct user_datum *usrdatum;
+ char *scontextp, *p, oldc;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ if (!ss_initialized) {
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 1; i < SECINITSID_NUM; i++) {
+ if (!strcmp(initial_sid_to_string[i], scontext)) {
+ *sid = i;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ *sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ *sid = SECSID_NULL;
+
+ /* Copy the string so that we can modify the copy as we parse it.
+ The string should already by null terminated, but we append a
+ null suffix to the copy to avoid problems with the existing
+ attr package, which doesn't view the null terminator as part
+ of the attribute value. */
+ scontext2 = kmalloc(scontext_len+1,GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!scontext2) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ memcpy(scontext2, scontext, scontext_len);
+ scontext2[scontext_len] = 0;
+
+ context_init(&context);
+ *sid = SECSID_NULL;
+
+ POLICY_RDLOCK;
+
+ /* Parse the security context. */
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ scontextp = (char *) scontext2;
+
+ /* Extract the user. */
+ p = scontextp;
+ while (*p && *p != ':')
+ p++;
+
+ if (*p == 0)
+ goto out_unlock;
+
+ *p++ = 0;
+
+ usrdatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_users.table, scontextp);
+ if (!usrdatum)
+ goto out_unlock;
+
+ context.user = usrdatum->value;
+
+ /* Extract role. */
+ scontextp = p;
+ while (*p && *p != ':')
+ p++;
+
+ if (*p == 0)
+ goto out_unlock;
+
+ *p++ = 0;
+
+ role = hashtab_search(policydb.p_roles.table, scontextp);
+ if (!role)
+ goto out_unlock;
+ context.role = role->value;
+
+ /* Extract type. */
+ scontextp = p;
+ while (*p && *p != ':')
+ p++;
+ oldc = *p;
+ *p++ = 0;
+
+ typdatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_types.table, scontextp);
+ if (!typdatum)
+ goto out_unlock;
+
+ context.type = typdatum->value;
+
+ rc = mls_context_to_sid(oldc, &p, &context);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out_unlock;
+
+ if ((p - scontext2) < scontext_len) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+
+ /* Check the validity of the new context. */
+ if (!policydb_context_isvalid(&policydb, &context)) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+ /* Obtain the new sid. */
+ rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &context, sid);
+out_unlock:
+ POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+ context_destroy(&context);
+ kfree(scontext2);
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int compute_sid_handle_invalid_context(
+ struct context *scontext,
+ struct context *tcontext,
+ u16 tclass,
+ struct context *newcontext)
+{
+ char *s = NULL, *t = NULL, *n = NULL;
+ u32 slen, tlen, nlen;
+
+ if (context_struct_to_string(scontext, &s, &slen) < 0)
+ goto out;
+ if (context_struct_to_string(tcontext, &t, &tlen) < 0)
+ goto out;
+ if (context_struct_to_string(newcontext, &n, &nlen) < 0)
+ goto out;
+ audit_log(current->audit_context,
+ "security_compute_sid: invalid context %s"
+ " for scontext=%s"
+ " tcontext=%s"
+ " tclass=%s",
+ n, s, t, policydb.p_class_val_to_name[tclass-1]);
+out:
+ kfree(s);
+ kfree(t);
+ kfree(n);
+ if (!selinux_enforcing)
+ return 0;
+ return -EACCES;
+}
+
+static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
+ u32 tsid,
+ u16 tclass,
+ u32 specified,
+ u32 *out_sid)
+{
+ struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL, newcontext;
+ struct role_trans *roletr = NULL;
+ struct avtab_key avkey;
+ struct avtab_datum *avdatum;
+ struct avtab_node *node;
+ unsigned int type_change = 0;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ if (!ss_initialized) {
+ switch (tclass) {
+ case SECCLASS_PROCESS:
+ *out_sid = ssid;
+ break;
+ default:
+ *out_sid = tsid;
+ break;
+ }
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ POLICY_RDLOCK;
+
+ scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid);
+ if (!scontext) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security_compute_sid: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ ssid);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+ tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tsid);
+ if (!tcontext) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security_compute_sid: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ tsid);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+
+ context_init(&newcontext);
+
+ /* Set the user identity. */
+ switch (specified) {
+ case AVTAB_TRANSITION:
+ case AVTAB_CHANGE:
+ /* Use the process user identity. */
+ newcontext.user = scontext->user;
+ break;
+ case AVTAB_MEMBER:
+ /* Use the related object owner. */
+ newcontext.user = tcontext->user;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Set the role and type to default values. */
+ switch (tclass) {
+ case SECCLASS_PROCESS:
+ /* Use the current role and type of process. */
+ newcontext.role = scontext->role;
+ newcontext.type = scontext->type;
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* Use the well-defined object role. */
+ newcontext.role = OBJECT_R_VAL;
+ /* Use the type of the related object. */
+ newcontext.type = tcontext->type;
+ }
+
+ /* Look for a type transition/member/change rule. */
+ avkey.source_type = scontext->type;
+ avkey.target_type = tcontext->type;
+ avkey.target_class = tclass;
+ avdatum = avtab_search(&policydb.te_avtab, &avkey, AVTAB_TYPE);
+
+ /* If no permanent rule, also check for enabled conditional rules */
+ if(!avdatum) {
+ node = avtab_search_node(&policydb.te_cond_avtab, &avkey, specified);
+ for (; node != NULL; node = avtab_search_node_next(node, specified)) {
+ if (node->datum.specified & AVTAB_ENABLED) {
+ avdatum = &node->datum;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ type_change = (avdatum && (avdatum->specified & specified));
+ if (type_change) {
+ /* Use the type from the type transition/member/change rule. */
+ switch (specified) {
+ case AVTAB_TRANSITION:
+ newcontext.type = avtab_transition(avdatum);
+ break;
+ case AVTAB_MEMBER:
+ newcontext.type = avtab_member(avdatum);
+ break;
+ case AVTAB_CHANGE:
+ newcontext.type = avtab_change(avdatum);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Check for class-specific changes. */
+ switch (tclass) {
+ case SECCLASS_PROCESS:
+ if (specified & AVTAB_TRANSITION) {
+ /* Look for a role transition rule. */
+ for (roletr = policydb.role_tr; roletr;
+ roletr = roletr->next) {
+ if (roletr->role == scontext->role &&
+ roletr->type == tcontext->type) {
+ /* Use the role transition rule. */
+ newcontext.role = roletr->new_role;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Set the MLS attributes.
+ This is done last because it may allocate memory. */
+ rc = mls_compute_sid(scontext, tcontext, tclass, specified, &newcontext);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out_unlock;
+
+ /* Check the validity of the context. */
+ if (!policydb_context_isvalid(&policydb, &newcontext)) {
+ rc = compute_sid_handle_invalid_context(scontext,
+ tcontext,
+ tclass,
+ &newcontext);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+ /* Obtain the sid for the context. */
+ rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &newcontext, out_sid);
+out_unlock:
+ POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+ context_destroy(&newcontext);
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_transition_sid - Compute the SID for a new subject/object.
+ * @ssid: source security identifier
+ * @tsid: target security identifier
+ * @tclass: target security class
+ * @out_sid: security identifier for new subject/object
+ *
+ * Compute a SID to use for labeling a new subject or object in the
+ * class @tclass based on a SID pair (@ssid, @tsid).
+ * Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid, -%ENOMEM
+ * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the new SID was
+ * computed successfully.
+ */
+int security_transition_sid(u32 ssid,
+ u32 tsid,
+ u16 tclass,
+ u32 *out_sid)
+{
+ return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_TRANSITION, out_sid);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_member_sid - Compute the SID for member selection.
+ * @ssid: source security identifier
+ * @tsid: target security identifier
+ * @tclass: target security class
+ * @out_sid: security identifier for selected member
+ *
+ * Compute a SID to use when selecting a member of a polyinstantiated
+ * object of class @tclass based on a SID pair (@ssid, @tsid).
+ * Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid, -%ENOMEM
+ * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the SID was
+ * computed successfully.
+ */
+int security_member_sid(u32 ssid,
+ u32 tsid,
+ u16 tclass,
+ u32 *out_sid)
+{
+ return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_MEMBER, out_sid);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_change_sid - Compute the SID for object relabeling.
+ * @ssid: source security identifier
+ * @tsid: target security identifier
+ * @tclass: target security class
+ * @out_sid: security identifier for selected member
+ *
+ * Compute a SID to use for relabeling an object of class @tclass
+ * based on a SID pair (@ssid, @tsid).
+ * Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid, -%ENOMEM
+ * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the SID was
+ * computed successfully.
+ */
+int security_change_sid(u32 ssid,
+ u32 tsid,
+ u16 tclass,
+ u32 *out_sid)
+{
+ return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_CHANGE, out_sid);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify that each permission that is defined under the
+ * existing policy is still defined with the same value
+ * in the new policy.
+ */
+static int validate_perm(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+ struct hashtab *h;
+ struct perm_datum *perdatum, *perdatum2;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+
+ h = p;
+ perdatum = datum;
+
+ perdatum2 = hashtab_search(h, key);
+ if (!perdatum2) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security: permission %s disappeared",
+ (char *)key);
+ rc = -ENOENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (perdatum->value != perdatum2->value) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security: the value of permission %s changed",
+ (char *)key);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ }
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify that each class that is defined under the
+ * existing policy is still defined with the same
+ * attributes in the new policy.
+ */
+static int validate_class(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+ struct policydb *newp;
+ struct class_datum *cladatum, *cladatum2;
+ int rc;
+
+ newp = p;
+ cladatum = datum;
+
+ cladatum2 = hashtab_search(newp->p_classes.table, key);
+ if (!cladatum2) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security: class %s disappeared\n",
+ (char *)key);
+ rc = -ENOENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (cladatum->value != cladatum2->value) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security: the value of class %s changed\n",
+ (char *)key);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((cladatum->comdatum && !cladatum2->comdatum) ||
+ (!cladatum->comdatum && cladatum2->comdatum)) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security: the inherits clause for the access "
+ "vector definition for class %s changed\n", (char *)key);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (cladatum->comdatum) {
+ rc = hashtab_map(cladatum->comdatum->permissions.table, validate_perm,
+ cladatum2->comdatum->permissions.table);
+ if (rc) {
+ printk(" in the access vector definition for class "
+ "%s\n", (char *)key);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ rc = hashtab_map(cladatum->permissions.table, validate_perm,
+ cladatum2->permissions.table);
+ if (rc)
+ printk(" in access vector definition for class %s\n",
+ (char *)key);
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/* Clone the SID into the new SID table. */
+static int clone_sid(u32 sid,
+ struct context *context,
+ void *arg)
+{
+ struct sidtab *s = arg;
+
+ return sidtab_insert(s, sid, context);
+}
+
+static inline int convert_context_handle_invalid_context(struct context *context)
+{
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ if (selinux_enforcing) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ } else {
+ char *s;
+ u32 len;
+
+ context_struct_to_string(context, &s, &len);
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security: context %s is invalid\n", s);
+ kfree(s);
+ }
+ return rc;
+}
+
+struct convert_context_args {
+ struct policydb *oldp;
+ struct policydb *newp;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Convert the values in the security context
+ * structure `c' from the values specified
+ * in the policy `p->oldp' to the values specified
+ * in the policy `p->newp'. Verify that the
+ * context is valid under the new policy.
+ */
+static int convert_context(u32 key,
+ struct context *c,
+ void *p)
+{
+ struct convert_context_args *args;
+ struct context oldc;
+ struct role_datum *role;
+ struct type_datum *typdatum;
+ struct user_datum *usrdatum;
+ char *s;
+ u32 len;
+ int rc;
+
+ args = p;
+
+ rc = context_cpy(&oldc, c);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+
+ /* Convert the user. */
+ usrdatum = hashtab_search(args->newp->p_users.table,
+ args->oldp->p_user_val_to_name[c->user - 1]);
+ if (!usrdatum) {
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ c->user = usrdatum->value;
+
+ /* Convert the role. */
+ role = hashtab_search(args->newp->p_roles.table,
+ args->oldp->p_role_val_to_name[c->role - 1]);
+ if (!role) {
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ c->role = role->value;
+
+ /* Convert the type. */
+ typdatum = hashtab_search(args->newp->p_types.table,
+ args->oldp->p_type_val_to_name[c->type - 1]);
+ if (!typdatum) {
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ c->type = typdatum->value;
+
+ rc = mls_convert_context(args->oldp, args->newp, c);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ /* Check the validity of the new context. */
+ if (!policydb_context_isvalid(args->newp, c)) {
+ rc = convert_context_handle_invalid_context(&oldc);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ context_destroy(&oldc);
+out:
+ return rc;
+bad:
+ context_struct_to_string(&oldc, &s, &len);
+ context_destroy(&oldc);
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security: invalidating context %s\n", s);
+ kfree(s);
+ goto out;
+}
+
+extern void selinux_complete_init(void);
+
+/**
+ * security_load_policy - Load a security policy configuration.
+ * @data: binary policy data
+ * @len: length of data in bytes
+ *
+ * Load a new set of security policy configuration data,
+ * validate it and convert the SID table as necessary.
+ * This function will flush the access vector cache after
+ * loading the new policy.
+ */
+int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ struct policydb oldpolicydb, newpolicydb;
+ struct sidtab oldsidtab, newsidtab;
+ struct convert_context_args args;
+ u32 seqno;
+ int rc = 0;
+ struct policy_file file = { data, len }, *fp = &file;
+
+ LOAD_LOCK;
+
+ if (!ss_initialized) {
+ avtab_cache_init();
+ if (policydb_read(&policydb, fp)) {
+ LOAD_UNLOCK;
+ avtab_cache_destroy();
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ if (policydb_load_isids(&policydb, &sidtab)) {
+ LOAD_UNLOCK;
+ policydb_destroy(&policydb);
+ avtab_cache_destroy();
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ policydb_loaded_version = policydb.policyvers;
+ ss_initialized = 1;
+
+ LOAD_UNLOCK;
+ selinux_complete_init();
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+#if 0
+ sidtab_hash_eval(&sidtab, "sids");
+#endif
+
+ if (policydb_read(&newpolicydb, fp)) {
+ LOAD_UNLOCK;
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ sidtab_init(&newsidtab);
+
+ /* Verify that the existing classes did not change. */
+ if (hashtab_map(policydb.p_classes.table, validate_class, &newpolicydb)) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security: the definition of an existing "
+ "class changed\n");
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Clone the SID table. */
+ sidtab_shutdown(&sidtab);
+ if (sidtab_map(&sidtab, clone_sid, &newsidtab)) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Convert the internal representations of contexts
+ in the new SID table and remove invalid SIDs. */
+ args.oldp = &policydb;
+ args.newp = &newpolicydb;
+ sidtab_map_remove_on_error(&newsidtab, convert_context, &args);
+
+ /* Save the old policydb and SID table to free later. */
+ memcpy(&oldpolicydb, &policydb, sizeof policydb);
+ sidtab_set(&oldsidtab, &sidtab);
+
+ /* Install the new policydb and SID table. */
+ POLICY_WRLOCK;
+ memcpy(&policydb, &newpolicydb, sizeof policydb);
+ sidtab_set(&sidtab, &newsidtab);
+ seqno = ++latest_granting;
+ policydb_loaded_version = policydb.policyvers;
+ POLICY_WRUNLOCK;
+ LOAD_UNLOCK;
+
+ /* Free the old policydb and SID table. */
+ policydb_destroy(&oldpolicydb);
+ sidtab_destroy(&oldsidtab);
+
+ avc_ss_reset(seqno);
+ selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
+
+ return 0;
+
+err:
+ LOAD_UNLOCK;
+ sidtab_destroy(&newsidtab);
+ policydb_destroy(&newpolicydb);
+ return rc;
+
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_port_sid - Obtain the SID for a port.
+ * @domain: communication domain aka address family
+ * @type: socket type
+ * @protocol: protocol number
+ * @port: port number
+ * @out_sid: security identifier
+ */
+int security_port_sid(u16 domain,
+ u16 type,
+ u8 protocol,
+ u16 port,
+ u32 *out_sid)
+{
+ struct ocontext *c;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ POLICY_RDLOCK;
+
+ c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_PORT];
+ while (c) {
+ if (c->u.port.protocol == protocol &&
+ c->u.port.low_port <= port &&
+ c->u.port.high_port >= port)
+ break;
+ c = c->next;
+ }
+
+ if (c) {
+ if (!c->sid[0]) {
+ rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
+ &c->context[0],
+ &c->sid[0]);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ *out_sid = c->sid[0];
+ } else {
+ *out_sid = SECINITSID_PORT;
+ }
+
+out:
+ POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_netif_sid - Obtain the SID for a network interface.
+ * @name: interface name
+ * @if_sid: interface SID
+ * @msg_sid: default SID for received packets
+ */
+int security_netif_sid(char *name,
+ u32 *if_sid,
+ u32 *msg_sid)
+{
+ int rc = 0;
+ struct ocontext *c;
+
+ POLICY_RDLOCK;
+
+ c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_NETIF];
+ while (c) {
+ if (strcmp(name, c->u.name) == 0)
+ break;
+ c = c->next;
+ }
+
+ if (c) {
+ if (!c->sid[0] || !c->sid[1]) {
+ rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
+ &c->context[0],
+ &c->sid[0]);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
+ &c->context[1],
+ &c->sid[1]);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ *if_sid = c->sid[0];
+ *msg_sid = c->sid[1];
+ } else {
+ *if_sid = SECINITSID_NETIF;
+ *msg_sid = SECINITSID_NETMSG;
+ }
+
+out:
+ POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int match_ipv6_addrmask(u32 *input, u32 *addr, u32 *mask)
+{
+ int i, fail = 0;
+
+ for(i = 0; i < 4; i++)
+ if(addr[i] != (input[i] & mask[i])) {
+ fail = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return !fail;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_node_sid - Obtain the SID for a node (host).
+ * @domain: communication domain aka address family
+ * @addrp: address
+ * @addrlen: address length in bytes
+ * @out_sid: security identifier
+ */
+int security_node_sid(u16 domain,
+ void *addrp,
+ u32 addrlen,
+ u32 *out_sid)
+{
+ int rc = 0;
+ struct ocontext *c;
+
+ POLICY_RDLOCK;
+
+ switch (domain) {
+ case AF_INET: {
+ u32 addr;
+
+ if (addrlen != sizeof(u32)) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ addr = *((u32 *)addrp);
+
+ c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_NODE];
+ while (c) {
+ if (c->u.node.addr == (addr & c->u.node.mask))
+ break;
+ c = c->next;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+
+ case AF_INET6:
+ if (addrlen != sizeof(u64) * 2) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_NODE6];
+ while (c) {
+ if (match_ipv6_addrmask(addrp, c->u.node6.addr,
+ c->u.node6.mask))
+ break;
+ c = c->next;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ *out_sid = SECINITSID_NODE;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (c) {
+ if (!c->sid[0]) {
+ rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
+ &c->context[0],
+ &c->sid[0]);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ *out_sid = c->sid[0];
+ } else {
+ *out_sid = SECINITSID_NODE;
+ }
+
+out:
+ POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+ return rc;
+}
+
+#define SIDS_NEL 25
+
+/**
+ * security_get_user_sids - Obtain reachable SIDs for a user.
+ * @fromsid: starting SID
+ * @username: username
+ * @sids: array of reachable SIDs for user
+ * @nel: number of elements in @sids
+ *
+ * Generate the set of SIDs for legal security contexts
+ * for a given user that can be reached by @fromsid.
+ * Set *@sids to point to a dynamically allocated
+ * array containing the set of SIDs. Set *@nel to the
+ * number of elements in the array.
+ */
+
+int security_get_user_sids(u32 fromsid,
+ char *username,
+ u32 **sids,
+ u32 *nel)
+{
+ struct context *fromcon, usercon;
+ u32 *mysids, *mysids2, sid;
+ u32 mynel = 0, maxnel = SIDS_NEL;
+ struct user_datum *user;
+ struct role_datum *role;
+ struct av_decision avd;
+ int rc = 0, i, j;
+
+ if (!ss_initialized) {
+ *sids = NULL;
+ *nel = 0;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ POLICY_RDLOCK;
+
+ fromcon = sidtab_search(&sidtab, fromsid);
+ if (!fromcon) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+
+ user = hashtab_search(policydb.p_users.table, username);
+ if (!user) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+ usercon.user = user->value;
+
+ mysids = kmalloc(maxnel*sizeof(*mysids), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!mysids) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+ memset(mysids, 0, maxnel*sizeof(*mysids));
+
+ for (i = ebitmap_startbit(&user->roles); i < ebitmap_length(&user->roles); i++) {
+ if (!ebitmap_get_bit(&user->roles, i))
+ continue;
+ role = policydb.role_val_to_struct[i];
+ usercon.role = i+1;
+ for (j = ebitmap_startbit(&role->types); j < ebitmap_length(&role->types); j++) {
+ if (!ebitmap_get_bit(&role->types, j))
+ continue;
+ usercon.type = j+1;
+
+ if (mls_setup_user_range(fromcon, user, &usercon))
+ continue;
+
+ rc = context_struct_compute_av(fromcon, &usercon,
+ SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+ PROCESS__TRANSITION,
+ &avd);
+ if (rc || !(avd.allowed & PROCESS__TRANSITION))
+ continue;
+ rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &usercon, &sid);
+ if (rc) {
+ kfree(mysids);
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+ if (mynel < maxnel) {
+ mysids[mynel++] = sid;
+ } else {
+ maxnel += SIDS_NEL;
+ mysids2 = kmalloc(maxnel*sizeof(*mysids2), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!mysids2) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ kfree(mysids);
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+ memset(mysids2, 0, maxnel*sizeof(*mysids2));
+ memcpy(mysids2, mysids, mynel * sizeof(*mysids2));
+ kfree(mysids);
+ mysids = mysids2;
+ mysids[mynel++] = sid;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ *sids = mysids;
+ *nel = mynel;
+
+out_unlock:
+ POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_genfs_sid - Obtain a SID for a file in a filesystem
+ * @fstype: filesystem type
+ * @path: path from root of mount
+ * @sclass: file security class
+ * @sid: SID for path
+ *
+ * Obtain a SID to use for a file in a filesystem that
+ * cannot support xattr or use a fixed labeling behavior like
+ * transition SIDs or task SIDs.
+ */
+int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype,
+ char *path,
+ u16 sclass,
+ u32 *sid)
+{
+ int len;
+ struct genfs *genfs;
+ struct ocontext *c;
+ int rc = 0, cmp = 0;
+
+ POLICY_RDLOCK;
+
+ for (genfs = policydb.genfs; genfs; genfs = genfs->next) {
+ cmp = strcmp(fstype, genfs->fstype);
+ if (cmp <= 0)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (!genfs || cmp) {
+ *sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+ rc = -ENOENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ for (c = genfs->head; c; c = c->next) {
+ len = strlen(c->u.name);
+ if ((!c->v.sclass || sclass == c->v.sclass) &&
+ (strncmp(c->u.name, path, len) == 0))
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (!c) {
+ *sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+ rc = -ENOENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (!c->sid[0]) {
+ rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
+ &c->context[0],
+ &c->sid[0]);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ *sid = c->sid[0];
+out:
+ POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_fs_use - Determine how to handle labeling for a filesystem.
+ * @fstype: filesystem type
+ * @behavior: labeling behavior
+ * @sid: SID for filesystem (superblock)
+ */
+int security_fs_use(
+ const char *fstype,
+ unsigned int *behavior,
+ u32 *sid)
+{
+ int rc = 0;
+ struct ocontext *c;
+
+ POLICY_RDLOCK;
+
+ c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_FSUSE];
+ while (c) {
+ if (strcmp(fstype, c->u.name) == 0)
+ break;
+ c = c->next;
+ }
+
+ if (c) {
+ *behavior = c->v.behavior;
+ if (!c->sid[0]) {
+ rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
+ &c->context[0],
+ &c->sid[0]);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ *sid = c->sid[0];
+ } else {
+ rc = security_genfs_sid(fstype, "/", SECCLASS_DIR, sid);
+ if (rc) {
+ *behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE;
+ rc = 0;
+ } else {
+ *behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS;
+ }
+ }
+
+out:
+ POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+ return rc;
+}
+
+int security_get_bools(int *len, char ***names, int **values)
+{
+ int i, rc = -ENOMEM;
+
+ POLICY_RDLOCK;
+ *names = NULL;
+ *values = NULL;
+
+ *len = policydb.p_bools.nprim;
+ if (!*len) {
+ rc = 0;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ *names = (char**)kmalloc(sizeof(char*) * *len, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!*names)
+ goto err;
+ memset(*names, 0, sizeof(char*) * *len);
+
+ *values = (int*)kmalloc(sizeof(int) * *len, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!*values)
+ goto err;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < *len; i++) {
+ size_t name_len;
+ (*values)[i] = policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state;
+ name_len = strlen(policydb.p_bool_val_to_name[i]) + 1;
+ (*names)[i] = (char*)kmalloc(sizeof(char) * name_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!(*names)[i])
+ goto err;
+ strncpy((*names)[i], policydb.p_bool_val_to_name[i], name_len);
+ (*names)[i][name_len - 1] = 0;
+ }
+ rc = 0;
+out:
+ POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+ return rc;
+err:
+ if (*names) {
+ for (i = 0; i < *len; i++)
+ if ((*names)[i])
+ kfree((*names)[i]);
+ }
+ if (*values)
+ kfree(*values);
+ goto out;
+}
+
+
+int security_set_bools(int len, int *values)
+{
+ int i, rc = 0;
+ int lenp, seqno = 0;
+ struct cond_node *cur;
+
+ POLICY_WRLOCK;
+
+ lenp = policydb.p_bools.nprim;
+ if (len != lenp) {
+ rc = -EFAULT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ printk(KERN_INFO "security: committed booleans { ");
+ for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+ if (values[i]) {
+ policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state = 1;
+ } else {
+ policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state = 0;
+ }
+ if (i != 0)
+ printk(", ");
+ printk("%s:%d", policydb.p_bool_val_to_name[i],
+ policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state);
+ }
+ printk(" }\n");
+
+ for (cur = policydb.cond_list; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) {
+ rc = evaluate_cond_node(&policydb, cur);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ seqno = ++latest_granting;
+
+out:
+ POLICY_WRUNLOCK;
+ if (!rc) {
+ avc_ss_reset(seqno);
+ selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
+ }
+ return rc;
+}
+
+int security_get_bool_value(int bool)
+{
+ int rc = 0;
+ int len;
+
+ POLICY_RDLOCK;
+
+ len = policydb.p_bools.nprim;
+ if (bool >= len) {
+ rc = -EFAULT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ rc = policydb.bool_val_to_struct[bool]->state;
+out:
+ POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+ return rc;
+}

Privacy Policy