|author||maximilian attems <email@example.com>||2008-04-16 19:36:36 +0200|
|committer||James Morris <firstname.lastname@example.org>||2008-04-18 20:26:18 +1000|
security: enhance DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR description
Got burned by setting the proposed default of 65536 across all Debian archs. Thus proposing to be more specific on which archs you may set this. Also propose a value for arm and friends that doesn't break sshd. Reword to mention working archs ia64 and ppc64 too. Signed-off-by: maximilian attems <email@example.com> Cc: Martin Michlmayr <firstname.lastname@example.org> Cc: Gordon Farquharson <email@example.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <firstname.lastname@example.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <email@example.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
1 files changed, 6 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index 5dfc206748cf..49b51f964897 100644
@@ -113,10 +113,12 @@ config SECURITY_DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
from userspace allocation. Keeping a user from writing to low pages
can help reduce the impact of kernel NULL pointer bugs.
- For most users with lots of address space a value of 65536 is
- reasonable and should cause no problems. Programs which use vm86
- functionality would either need additional permissions from either
- the LSM or the capabilities module or have this protection disabled.
+ For most ia64, ppc64 and x86 users with lots of address space
+ a value of 65536 is reasonable and should cause no problems.
+ On arm and other archs it should not be higher than 32768.
+ Programs which use vm86 functionality would either need additional
+ permissions from either the LSM or the capabilities module or have
+ this protection disabled.
This value can be changed after boot using the