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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2014-10-18 09:31:37 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2014-10-18 09:31:37 -0700
commit2e923b0251932ad4a82cc87ec1443a1f1d17073e (patch)
treed12032bc9bcfbb8a57659275d1b9b582f23f2ecc /net/sctp
parentffd8221bc348f8c282d1271883dbe629ea8ae289 (diff)
parentf2d9da1a8375cbe53df5b415d059429013a3a79f (diff)
Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net
Pull networking fixes from David Miller: 1) Include fixes for netrom and dsa (Fabian Frederick and Florian Fainelli) 2) Fix FIXED_PHY support in stmmac, from Giuseppe CAVALLARO. 3) Several SKB use after free fixes (vxlan, openvswitch, vxlan, ip_tunnel, fou), from Li ROngQing. 4) fec driver PTP support fixes from Luwei Zhou and Nimrod Andy. 5) Use after free in virtio_net, from Michael S Tsirkin. 6) Fix flow mask handling for megaflows in openvswitch, from Pravin B Shelar. 7) ISDN gigaset and capi bug fixes from Tilman Schmidt. 8) Fix route leak in ip_send_unicast_reply(), from Vasily Averin. 9) Fix two eBPF JIT bugs on x86, from Alexei Starovoitov. 10) TCP_SKB_CB() reorganization caused a few regressions, fixed by Cong Wang and Eric Dumazet. 11) Don't overwrite end of SKB when parsing malformed sctp ASCONF chunks, from Daniel Borkmann. 12) Don't call sock_kfree_s() with NULL pointers, this function also has the side effect of adjusting the socket memory usage. From Cong Wang. * git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net: (90 commits) bna: fix skb->truesize underestimation net: dsa: add includes for ethtool and phy_fixed definitions openvswitch: Set flow-key members. netrom: use linux/uaccess.h dsa: Fix conversion from host device to mii bus tipc: fix bug in bundled buffer reception ipv6: introduce tcp_v6_iif() sfc: add support for skb->xmit_more r8152: return -EBUSY for runtime suspend ipv4: fix a potential use after free in fou.c ipv4: fix a potential use after free in ip_tunnel_core.c hyperv: Add handling of IP header with option field in netvsc_set_hash() openvswitch: Create right mask with disabled megaflows vxlan: fix a free after use openvswitch: fix a use after free ipv4: dst_entry leak in ip_send_unicast_reply() ipv4: clean up cookie_v4_check() ipv4: share tcp_v4_save_options() with cookie_v4_check() ipv4: call __ip_options_echo() in cookie_v4_check() atm: simplify lanai.c by using module_pci_driver ...
Diffstat (limited to 'net/sctp')
-rw-r--r--net/sctp/associola.c2
-rw-r--r--net/sctp/inqueue.c33
-rw-r--r--net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c99
-rw-r--r--net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c21
4 files changed, 69 insertions, 86 deletions
diff --git a/net/sctp/associola.c b/net/sctp/associola.c
index a88b8524846e..f791edd64d6c 100644
--- a/net/sctp/associola.c
+++ b/net/sctp/associola.c
@@ -1668,6 +1668,8 @@ struct sctp_chunk *sctp_assoc_lookup_asconf_ack(
* ack chunk whose serial number matches that of the request.
*/
list_for_each_entry(ack, &asoc->asconf_ack_list, transmitted_list) {
+ if (sctp_chunk_pending(ack))
+ continue;
if (ack->subh.addip_hdr->serial == serial) {
sctp_chunk_hold(ack);
return ack;
diff --git a/net/sctp/inqueue.c b/net/sctp/inqueue.c
index 4de12afa13d4..7e8a16c77039 100644
--- a/net/sctp/inqueue.c
+++ b/net/sctp/inqueue.c
@@ -140,18 +140,9 @@ struct sctp_chunk *sctp_inq_pop(struct sctp_inq *queue)
} else {
/* Nothing to do. Next chunk in the packet, please. */
ch = (sctp_chunkhdr_t *) chunk->chunk_end;
-
/* Force chunk->skb->data to chunk->chunk_end. */
- skb_pull(chunk->skb,
- chunk->chunk_end - chunk->skb->data);
-
- /* Verify that we have at least chunk headers
- * worth of buffer left.
- */
- if (skb_headlen(chunk->skb) < sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t)) {
- sctp_chunk_free(chunk);
- chunk = queue->in_progress = NULL;
- }
+ skb_pull(chunk->skb, chunk->chunk_end - chunk->skb->data);
+ /* We are guaranteed to pull a SCTP header. */
}
}
@@ -187,24 +178,14 @@ struct sctp_chunk *sctp_inq_pop(struct sctp_inq *queue)
skb_pull(chunk->skb, sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t));
chunk->subh.v = NULL; /* Subheader is no longer valid. */
- if (chunk->chunk_end < skb_tail_pointer(chunk->skb)) {
+ if (chunk->chunk_end + sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t) <
+ skb_tail_pointer(chunk->skb)) {
/* This is not a singleton */
chunk->singleton = 0;
} else if (chunk->chunk_end > skb_tail_pointer(chunk->skb)) {
- /* RFC 2960, Section 6.10 Bundling
- *
- * Partial chunks MUST NOT be placed in an SCTP packet.
- * If the receiver detects a partial chunk, it MUST drop
- * the chunk.
- *
- * Since the end of the chunk is past the end of our buffer
- * (which contains the whole packet, we can freely discard
- * the whole packet.
- */
- sctp_chunk_free(chunk);
- chunk = queue->in_progress = NULL;
-
- return NULL;
+ /* Discard inside state machine. */
+ chunk->pdiscard = 1;
+ chunk->chunk_end = skb_tail_pointer(chunk->skb);
} else {
/* We are at the end of the packet, so mark the chunk
* in case we need to send a SACK.
diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
index ae0e616a7ca5..ab734be8cb20 100644
--- a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
+++ b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
@@ -3110,50 +3110,63 @@ static __be16 sctp_process_asconf_param(struct sctp_association *asoc,
return SCTP_ERROR_NO_ERROR;
}
-/* Verify the ASCONF packet before we process it. */
-int sctp_verify_asconf(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
- struct sctp_paramhdr *param_hdr, void *chunk_end,
- struct sctp_paramhdr **errp) {
- sctp_addip_param_t *asconf_param;
+/* Verify the ASCONF packet before we process it. */
+bool sctp_verify_asconf(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
+ struct sctp_chunk *chunk, bool addr_param_needed,
+ struct sctp_paramhdr **errp)
+{
+ sctp_addip_chunk_t *addip = (sctp_addip_chunk_t *) chunk->chunk_hdr;
union sctp_params param;
- int length, plen;
-
- param.v = (sctp_paramhdr_t *) param_hdr;
- while (param.v <= chunk_end - sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t)) {
- length = ntohs(param.p->length);
- *errp = param.p;
+ bool addr_param_seen = false;
- if (param.v > chunk_end - length ||
- length < sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t))
- return 0;
+ sctp_walk_params(param, addip, addip_hdr.params) {
+ size_t length = ntohs(param.p->length);
+ *errp = param.p;
switch (param.p->type) {
+ case SCTP_PARAM_ERR_CAUSE:
+ break;
+ case SCTP_PARAM_IPV4_ADDRESS:
+ if (length != sizeof(sctp_ipv4addr_param_t))
+ return false;
+ addr_param_seen = true;
+ break;
+ case SCTP_PARAM_IPV6_ADDRESS:
+ if (length != sizeof(sctp_ipv6addr_param_t))
+ return false;
+ addr_param_seen = true;
+ break;
case SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP:
case SCTP_PARAM_DEL_IP:
case SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY:
- asconf_param = (sctp_addip_param_t *)param.v;
- plen = ntohs(asconf_param->param_hdr.length);
- if (plen < sizeof(sctp_addip_param_t) +
- sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t))
- return 0;
+ /* In ASCONF chunks, these need to be first. */
+ if (addr_param_needed && !addr_param_seen)
+ return false;
+ length = ntohs(param.addip->param_hdr.length);
+ if (length < sizeof(sctp_addip_param_t) +
+ sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t))
+ return false;
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_SUCCESS_REPORT:
case SCTP_PARAM_ADAPTATION_LAYER_IND:
if (length != sizeof(sctp_addip_param_t))
- return 0;
-
+ return false;
break;
default:
- break;
+ /* This is unkown to us, reject! */
+ return false;
}
-
- param.v += WORD_ROUND(length);
}
- if (param.v != chunk_end)
- return 0;
+ /* Remaining sanity checks. */
+ if (addr_param_needed && !addr_param_seen)
+ return false;
+ if (!addr_param_needed && addr_param_seen)
+ return false;
+ if (param.v != chunk->chunk_end)
+ return false;
- return 1;
+ return true;
}
/* Process an incoming ASCONF chunk with the next expected serial no. and
@@ -3162,16 +3175,17 @@ int sctp_verify_asconf(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
struct sctp_chunk *sctp_process_asconf(struct sctp_association *asoc,
struct sctp_chunk *asconf)
{
+ sctp_addip_chunk_t *addip = (sctp_addip_chunk_t *) asconf->chunk_hdr;
+ bool all_param_pass = true;
+ union sctp_params param;
sctp_addiphdr_t *hdr;
union sctp_addr_param *addr_param;
sctp_addip_param_t *asconf_param;
struct sctp_chunk *asconf_ack;
-
__be16 err_code;
int length = 0;
int chunk_len;
__u32 serial;
- int all_param_pass = 1;
chunk_len = ntohs(asconf->chunk_hdr->length) - sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t);
hdr = (sctp_addiphdr_t *)asconf->skb->data;
@@ -3199,9 +3213,14 @@ struct sctp_chunk *sctp_process_asconf(struct sctp_association *asoc,
goto done;
/* Process the TLVs contained within the ASCONF chunk. */
- while (chunk_len > 0) {
+ sctp_walk_params(param, addip, addip_hdr.params) {
+ /* Skip preceeding address parameters. */
+ if (param.p->type == SCTP_PARAM_IPV4_ADDRESS ||
+ param.p->type == SCTP_PARAM_IPV6_ADDRESS)
+ continue;
+
err_code = sctp_process_asconf_param(asoc, asconf,
- asconf_param);
+ param.addip);
/* ADDIP 4.1 A7)
* If an error response is received for a TLV parameter,
* all TLVs with no response before the failed TLV are
@@ -3209,28 +3228,20 @@ struct sctp_chunk *sctp_process_asconf(struct sctp_association *asoc,
* the failed response are considered unsuccessful unless
* a specific success indication is present for the parameter.
*/
- if (SCTP_ERROR_NO_ERROR != err_code)
- all_param_pass = 0;
-
+ if (err_code != SCTP_ERROR_NO_ERROR)
+ all_param_pass = false;
if (!all_param_pass)
- sctp_add_asconf_response(asconf_ack,
- asconf_param->crr_id, err_code,
- asconf_param);
+ sctp_add_asconf_response(asconf_ack, param.addip->crr_id,
+ err_code, param.addip);
/* ADDIP 4.3 D11) When an endpoint receiving an ASCONF to add
* an IP address sends an 'Out of Resource' in its response, it
* MUST also fail any subsequent add or delete requests bundled
* in the ASCONF.
*/
- if (SCTP_ERROR_RSRC_LOW == err_code)
+ if (err_code == SCTP_ERROR_RSRC_LOW)
goto done;
-
- /* Move to the next ASCONF param. */
- length = ntohs(asconf_param->param_hdr.length);
- asconf_param = (void *)asconf_param + length;
- chunk_len -= length;
}
-
done:
asoc->peer.addip_serial++;
diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
index c8f606324134..3ee27b7704ff 100644
--- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
+++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
@@ -170,6 +170,9 @@ sctp_chunk_length_valid(struct sctp_chunk *chunk,
{
__u16 chunk_length = ntohs(chunk->chunk_hdr->length);
+ /* Previously already marked? */
+ if (unlikely(chunk->pdiscard))
+ return 0;
if (unlikely(chunk_length < required_length))
return 0;
@@ -3591,9 +3594,7 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_asconf(struct net *net,
struct sctp_chunk *asconf_ack = NULL;
struct sctp_paramhdr *err_param = NULL;
sctp_addiphdr_t *hdr;
- union sctp_addr_param *addr_param;
__u32 serial;
- int length;
if (!sctp_vtag_verify(chunk, asoc)) {
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_REPORT_BAD_TAG,
@@ -3618,17 +3619,8 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_asconf(struct net *net,
hdr = (sctp_addiphdr_t *)chunk->skb->data;
serial = ntohl(hdr->serial);
- addr_param = (union sctp_addr_param *)hdr->params;
- length = ntohs(addr_param->p.length);
- if (length < sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t))
- return sctp_sf_violation_paramlen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
- (void *)addr_param, commands);
-
/* Verify the ASCONF chunk before processing it. */
- if (!sctp_verify_asconf(asoc,
- (sctp_paramhdr_t *)((void *)addr_param + length),
- (void *)chunk->chunk_end,
- &err_param))
+ if (!sctp_verify_asconf(asoc, chunk, true, &err_param))
return sctp_sf_violation_paramlen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
(void *)err_param, commands);
@@ -3745,10 +3737,7 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_asconf_ack(struct net *net,
rcvd_serial = ntohl(addip_hdr->serial);
/* Verify the ASCONF-ACK chunk before processing it. */
- if (!sctp_verify_asconf(asoc,
- (sctp_paramhdr_t *)addip_hdr->params,
- (void *)asconf_ack->chunk_end,
- &err_param))
+ if (!sctp_verify_asconf(asoc, asconf_ack, false, &err_param))
return sctp_sf_violation_paramlen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
(void *)err_param, commands);

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