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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2015-02-11 20:25:11 -0800
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2015-02-11 20:25:11 -0800
commit8cc748aa76c921d8834ef00f762f31acd2c93aa8 (patch)
tree764b0ba9b9c16658bbb1077458605dc3faac0411 /security
parent7184487f14eb7c2fcf8337bb16c6a63b6db1252e (diff)
parent04f81f0154e4bf002be6f4d85668ce1257efa4d9 (diff)
Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security layer updates from James Morris: "Highlights: - Smack adds secmark support for Netfilter - /proc/keys is now mandatory if CONFIG_KEYS=y - TPM gets its own device class - Added TPM 2.0 support - Smack file hook rework (all Smack users should review this!)" * 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (64 commits) cipso: don't use IPCB() to locate the CIPSO IP option SELinux: fix error code in policydb_init() selinux: add security in-core xattr support for pstore and debugfs selinux: quiet the filesystem labeling behavior message selinux: Remove unused function avc_sidcmp() ima: /proc/keys is now mandatory Smack: Repair netfilter dependency X.509: silence asn1 compiler debug output X.509: shut up about included cert for silent build KEYS: Make /proc/keys unconditional if CONFIG_KEYS=y MAINTAINERS: email update tpm/tpm_tis: Add missing ifdef CONFIG_ACPI for pnp_acpi_device smack: fix possible use after frees in task_security() callers smack: Add missing logging in bidirectional UDS connect check Smack: secmark support for netfilter Smack: Rework file hooks tpm: fix format string error in tpm-chip.c char/tpm/tpm_crb: fix build error smack: Fix a bidirectional UDS connect check typo smack: introduce a special case for tmpfs in smack_d_instantiate() ...
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/Kconfig1
-rw-r--r--security/keys/Kconfig18
-rw-r--r--security/keys/proc.c8
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/avc.c5
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c29
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/policydb.c8
-rw-r--r--security/smack/Kconfig12
-rw-r--r--security/smack/Makefile1
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smack.h11
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smack_lsm.c199
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smack_netfilter.c96
11 files changed, 281 insertions, 107 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
index 57515bc915c0..df303346029b 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
@@ -126,7 +126,6 @@ config IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING
bool "Require all keys on the .ima keyring be signed"
depends on IMA_APPRAISE && SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
depends on INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
- select KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS
default y
help
This option requires that all keys added to the .ima
diff --git a/security/keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/Kconfig
index a4f3f8c48d6e..72483b8f1be5 100644
--- a/security/keys/Kconfig
+++ b/security/keys/Kconfig
@@ -80,21 +80,3 @@ config ENCRYPTED_KEYS
Userspace only ever sees/stores encrypted blobs.
If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
-
-config KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS
- bool "Enable the /proc/keys file by which keys may be viewed"
- depends on KEYS
- help
- This option turns on support for the /proc/keys file - through which
- can be listed all the keys on the system that are viewable by the
- reading process.
-
- The only keys included in the list are those that grant View
- permission to the reading process whether or not it possesses them.
- Note that LSM security checks are still performed, and may further
- filter out keys that the current process is not authorised to view.
-
- Only key attributes are listed here; key payloads are not included in
- the resulting table.
-
- If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
diff --git a/security/keys/proc.c b/security/keys/proc.c
index 972eeb336b81..f0611a6368cd 100644
--- a/security/keys/proc.c
+++ b/security/keys/proc.c
@@ -18,7 +18,6 @@
#include <asm/errno.h>
#include "internal.h"
-#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS
static int proc_keys_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file);
static void *proc_keys_start(struct seq_file *p, loff_t *_pos);
static void *proc_keys_next(struct seq_file *p, void *v, loff_t *_pos);
@@ -38,7 +37,6 @@ static const struct file_operations proc_keys_fops = {
.llseek = seq_lseek,
.release = seq_release,
};
-#endif
static int proc_key_users_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file);
static void *proc_key_users_start(struct seq_file *p, loff_t *_pos);
@@ -67,11 +65,9 @@ static int __init key_proc_init(void)
{
struct proc_dir_entry *p;
-#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS
p = proc_create("keys", 0, NULL, &proc_keys_fops);
if (!p)
panic("Cannot create /proc/keys\n");
-#endif
p = proc_create("key-users", 0, NULL, &proc_key_users_fops);
if (!p)
@@ -86,8 +82,6 @@ __initcall(key_proc_init);
* Implement "/proc/keys" to provide a list of the keys on the system that
* grant View permission to the caller.
*/
-#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS
-
static struct rb_node *key_serial_next(struct seq_file *p, struct rb_node *n)
{
struct user_namespace *user_ns = seq_user_ns(p);
@@ -275,8 +269,6 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
return 0;
}
-#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS */
-
static struct rb_node *__key_user_next(struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct rb_node *n)
{
while (n) {
diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index a18f1fa6440b..afcc0aed9393 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -517,11 +517,6 @@ out:
return rc;
}
-static inline int avc_sidcmp(u32 x, u32 y)
-{
- return (x == y || x == SECSID_WILD || y == SECSID_WILD);
-}
-
/**
* avc_update_node Update an AVC entry
* @event : Updating event
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 6da7532893a1..87a915656eab 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -401,23 +401,14 @@ static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb)
{
struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
- if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR ||
- sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS ||
- sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK)
- return 1;
-
- /* Special handling for sysfs. Is genfs but also has setxattr handler*/
- if (strncmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs", sizeof("sysfs")) == 0)
- return 1;
-
- /*
- * Special handling for rootfs. Is genfs but supports
- * setting SELinux context on in-core inodes.
- */
- if (strncmp(sb->s_type->name, "rootfs", sizeof("rootfs")) == 0)
- return 1;
-
- return 0;
+ return sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR ||
+ sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS ||
+ sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK ||
+ /* Special handling. Genfs but also in-core setxattr handler */
+ !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
+ !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") ||
+ !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
+ !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "rootfs");
}
static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
@@ -456,10 +447,6 @@ static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
- else
- printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
- sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
- labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
sbsec->flags |= SE_SBINITIALIZED;
if (selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(sb))
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
index bc2a586f095c..74aa224267c1 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -289,12 +289,16 @@ static int policydb_init(struct policydb *p)
goto out;
p->filename_trans = hashtab_create(filenametr_hash, filenametr_cmp, (1 << 10));
- if (!p->filename_trans)
+ if (!p->filename_trans) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
+ }
p->range_tr = hashtab_create(rangetr_hash, rangetr_cmp, 256);
- if (!p->range_tr)
+ if (!p->range_tr) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
+ }
ebitmap_init(&p->filename_trans_ttypes);
ebitmap_init(&p->policycaps);
diff --git a/security/smack/Kconfig b/security/smack/Kconfig
index b065f9789418..271adae81796 100644
--- a/security/smack/Kconfig
+++ b/security/smack/Kconfig
@@ -28,3 +28,15 @@ config SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
access rule set once the behavior is well understood.
This is a superior mechanism to the oft abused
"permissive" mode of other systems.
+ If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+
+config SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
+ bool "Packet marking using secmarks for netfilter"
+ depends on SECURITY_SMACK
+ depends on NETWORK_SECMARK
+ depends on NETFILTER
+ default n
+ help
+ This enables security marking of network packets using
+ Smack labels.
+ If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
diff --git a/security/smack/Makefile b/security/smack/Makefile
index 67a63aaec827..ee2ebd504541 100644
--- a/security/smack/Makefile
+++ b/security/smack/Makefile
@@ -5,3 +5,4 @@
obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) := smack.o
smack-y := smack_lsm.o smack_access.o smackfs.o
+smack-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER) += smack_netfilter.o
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index b828a379377c..67ccb7b2b89b 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -248,6 +248,7 @@ struct smack_known *smk_find_entry(const char *);
/*
* Shared data.
*/
+extern int smack_enabled;
extern int smack_cipso_direct;
extern int smack_cipso_mapped;
extern struct smack_known *smack_net_ambient;
@@ -298,6 +299,16 @@ static inline struct smack_known *smk_of_task(const struct task_smack *tsp)
return tsp->smk_task;
}
+static inline struct smack_known *smk_of_task_struct(const struct task_struct *t)
+{
+ struct smack_known *skp;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ skp = smk_of_task(__task_cred(t)->security);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return skp;
+}
+
/*
* Present a pointer to the forked smack label entry in an task blob.
*/
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index f1b17a476e12..a0ccce4e46f8 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -43,8 +43,6 @@
#include <linux/binfmts.h>
#include "smack.h"
-#define task_security(task) (task_cred_xxx((task), security))
-
#define TRANS_TRUE "TRUE"
#define TRANS_TRUE_SIZE 4
@@ -52,8 +50,11 @@
#define SMK_RECEIVING 1
#define SMK_SENDING 2
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) && !defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER)
LIST_HEAD(smk_ipv6_port_list);
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 && !CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER */
static struct kmem_cache *smack_inode_cache;
+int smack_enabled;
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
static void smk_bu_mode(int mode, char *s)
@@ -120,7 +121,7 @@ static int smk_bu_current(char *note, struct smack_known *oskp,
static int smk_bu_task(struct task_struct *otp, int mode, int rc)
{
struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
- struct task_smack *otsp = task_security(otp);
+ struct smack_known *smk_task = smk_of_task_struct(otp);
char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
if (rc <= 0)
@@ -128,7 +129,7 @@ static int smk_bu_task(struct task_struct *otp, int mode, int rc)
smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
pr_info("Smack Bringup: (%s %s %s) %s to %s\n",
- tsp->smk_task->smk_known, otsp->smk_task->smk_known, acc,
+ tsp->smk_task->smk_known, smk_task->smk_known, acc,
current->comm, otp->comm);
return 0;
}
@@ -160,7 +161,7 @@ static int smk_bu_file(struct file *file, int mode, int rc)
{
struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
struct smack_known *sskp = tsp->smk_task;
- struct inode *inode = file->f_inode;
+ struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
if (rc <= 0)
@@ -168,7 +169,7 @@ static int smk_bu_file(struct file *file, int mode, int rc)
smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
pr_info("Smack Bringup: (%s %s %s) file=(%s %ld %pD) %s\n",
- sskp->smk_known, (char *)file->f_security, acc,
+ sskp->smk_known, smk_of_inode(inode)->smk_known, acc,
inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, file,
current->comm);
return 0;
@@ -202,6 +203,7 @@ static int smk_bu_credfile(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file,
/**
* smk_fetch - Fetch the smack label from a file.
+ * @name: type of the label (attribute)
* @ip: a pointer to the inode
* @dp: a pointer to the dentry
*
@@ -254,7 +256,9 @@ struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(struct smack_known *skp)
/**
* new_task_smack - allocate a task security blob
- * @smack: a pointer to the Smack label to use in the blob
+ * @task: a pointer to the Smack label for the running task
+ * @forked: a pointer to the Smack label for the forked task
+ * @gfp: type of the memory for the allocation
*
* Returns the new blob or NULL if there's no memory available
*/
@@ -277,8 +281,9 @@ static struct task_smack *new_task_smack(struct smack_known *task,
/**
* smk_copy_rules - copy a rule set
- * @nhead - new rules header pointer
- * @ohead - old rules header pointer
+ * @nhead: new rules header pointer
+ * @ohead: old rules header pointer
+ * @gfp: type of the memory for the allocation
*
* Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM on error
*/
@@ -345,7 +350,8 @@ static int smk_ptrace_rule_check(struct task_struct *tracer,
saip = &ad;
}
- tsp = task_security(tracer);
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ tsp = __task_cred(tracer)->security;
tracer_known = smk_of_task(tsp);
if ((mode & PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH) &&
@@ -365,11 +371,14 @@ static int smk_ptrace_rule_check(struct task_struct *tracer,
tracee_known->smk_known,
0, rc, saip);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
return rc;
}
/* In case of rule==SMACK_PTRACE_DEFAULT or mode==PTRACE_MODE_READ */
rc = smk_tskacc(tsp, tracee_known, smk_ptrace_mode(mode), saip);
+
+ rcu_read_unlock();
return rc;
}
@@ -396,7 +405,7 @@ static int smack_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode)
if (rc != 0)
return rc;
- skp = smk_of_task(task_security(ctp));
+ skp = smk_of_task_struct(ctp);
rc = smk_ptrace_rule_check(current, skp, mode, __func__);
return rc;
@@ -796,7 +805,7 @@ static int smack_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
if (name)
*name = XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX;
- if (value) {
+ if (value && len) {
rcu_read_lock();
may = smk_access_entry(skp->smk_known, dsp->smk_known,
&skp->smk_rules);
@@ -817,10 +826,9 @@ static int smack_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
*value = kstrdup(isp->smk_known, GFP_NOFS);
if (*value == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
- }
- if (len)
*len = strlen(isp->smk_known);
+ }
return 0;
}
@@ -1344,6 +1352,9 @@ static int smack_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
* The security blob for a file is a pointer to the master
* label list, so no allocation is done.
*
+ * f_security is the owner security information. It
+ * isn't used on file access checks, it's for send_sigio.
+ *
* Returns 0
*/
static int smack_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
@@ -1381,17 +1392,18 @@ static int smack_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
{
int rc = 0;
struct smk_audit_info ad;
+ struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE) {
- rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+ rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_WRITE, rc);
}
if (rc == 0 && (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ)) {
- rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_READ, &ad);
+ rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_READ, &ad);
rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_READ, rc);
}
@@ -1409,10 +1421,11 @@ static int smack_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
{
struct smk_audit_info ad;
int rc;
+ struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
- rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_LOCK, &ad);
+ rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_LOCK, &ad);
rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_LOCK, rc);
return rc;
}
@@ -1434,7 +1447,7 @@ static int smack_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
{
struct smk_audit_info ad;
int rc = 0;
-
+ struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
switch (cmd) {
case F_GETLK:
@@ -1443,14 +1456,14 @@ static int smack_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
case F_SETLKW:
smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
- rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_LOCK, &ad);
+ rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_LOCK, &ad);
rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_LOCK, rc);
break;
case F_SETOWN:
case F_SETSIG:
smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
- rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+ rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_WRITE, rc);
break;
default:
@@ -1568,14 +1581,10 @@ static int smack_mmap_file(struct file *file,
* smack_file_set_fowner - set the file security blob value
* @file: object in question
*
- * Returns 0
- * Further research may be required on this one.
*/
static void smack_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
{
- struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
-
- file->f_security = skp;
+ file->f_security = smk_of_current();
}
/**
@@ -1627,6 +1636,7 @@ static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file)
int rc;
int may = 0;
struct smk_audit_info ad;
+ struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
@@ -1638,7 +1648,7 @@ static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file)
if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)
may |= MAY_WRITE;
- rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, may, &ad);
+ rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), may, &ad);
rc = smk_bu_file(file, may, rc);
return rc;
}
@@ -1658,21 +1668,17 @@ static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file)
static int smack_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
{
struct task_smack *tsp = cred->security;
- struct inode_smack *isp = file_inode(file)->i_security;
+ struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
struct smk_audit_info ad;
int rc;
- if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) {
- file->f_security = isp->smk_inode;
+ if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
return 0;
- }
smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
- rc = smk_access(tsp->smk_task, isp->smk_inode, MAY_READ, &ad);
+ rc = smk_access(tsp->smk_task, smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_READ, &ad);
rc = smk_bu_credfile(cred, file, MAY_READ, rc);
- if (rc == 0)
- file->f_security = isp->smk_inode;
return rc;
}
@@ -1826,7 +1832,7 @@ static int smk_curacc_on_task(struct task_struct *p, int access,
const char *caller)
{
struct smk_audit_info ad;
- struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(task_security(p));
+ struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(p);
int rc;
smk_ad_init(&ad, caller, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
@@ -1879,7 +1885,7 @@ static int smack_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
*/
static void smack_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
{
- struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(task_security(p));
+ struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(p);
*secid = skp->smk_secid;
}
@@ -1986,7 +1992,7 @@ static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
{
struct smk_audit_info ad;
struct smack_known *skp;
- struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task(task_security(p));
+ struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task_struct(p);
int rc;
smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
@@ -2040,7 +2046,7 @@ static int smack_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
static void smack_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode)
{
struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
- struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(task_security(p));
+ struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(p);
isp->smk_inode = skp;
}
@@ -2212,6 +2218,7 @@ static int smack_netlabel_send(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in *sap)
return smack_netlabel(sk, sk_lbl);
}
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) && !defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER)
/**
* smk_ipv6_port_label - Smack port access table management
* @sock: socket
@@ -2361,6 +2368,7 @@ auditout:
rc = smk_bu_note("IPv6 port check", skp, object, MAY_WRITE, rc);
return rc;
}
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 && !CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER */
/**
* smack_inode_setsecurity - set smack xattrs
@@ -2421,8 +2429,10 @@ static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
} else
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) && !defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER)
if (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_INET6)
smk_ipv6_port_label(sock, NULL);
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 && !CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER */
return 0;
}
@@ -2450,6 +2460,7 @@ static int smack_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
return smack_netlabel(sock->sk, SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET);
}
+#ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
/**
* smack_socket_bind - record port binding information.
* @sock: the socket
@@ -2463,11 +2474,14 @@ static int smack_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
static int smack_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
int addrlen)
{
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
if (sock->sk != NULL && sock->sk->sk_family == PF_INET6)
smk_ipv6_port_label(sock, address);
+#endif
return 0;
}
+#endif /* !CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER */
/**
* smack_socket_connect - connect access check
@@ -2496,8 +2510,10 @@ static int smack_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *sap,
case PF_INET6:
if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6))
return -EINVAL;
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) && !defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER)
rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sock->sk, (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sap,
SMK_CONNECTING);
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 && !CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER */
break;
}
return rc;
@@ -3033,7 +3049,8 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
* of the superblock.
*/
if (opt_dentry->d_parent == opt_dentry) {
- if (sbp->s_magic == CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC) {
+ switch (sbp->s_magic) {
+ case CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC:
/*
* The cgroup filesystem is never mounted,
* so there's no opportunity to set the mount
@@ -3041,8 +3058,19 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
*/
sbsp->smk_root = &smack_known_star;
sbsp->smk_default = &smack_known_star;
+ isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_root;
+ break;
+ case TMPFS_MAGIC:
+ /*
+ * What about shmem/tmpfs anonymous files with dentry
+ * obtained from d_alloc_pseudo()?
+ */
+ isp->smk_inode = smk_of_current();
+ break;
+ default:
+ isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_root;
+ break;
}
- isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_root;
isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_INSTANT;
goto unlockandout;
}
@@ -3200,7 +3228,7 @@ unlockandout:
*/
static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value)
{
- struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(task_security(p));
+ struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(p);
char *cp;
int slen;
@@ -3297,7 +3325,7 @@ static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) {
skp = ssp->smk_out;
- okp = osp->smk_out;
+ okp = osp->smk_in;
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other);
@@ -3305,7 +3333,9 @@ static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
rc = smk_access(skp, okp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
rc = smk_bu_note("UDS connect", skp, okp, MAY_WRITE, rc);
if (rc == 0) {
- rc = smk_access(okp, skp, MAY_WRITE, NULL);
+ okp = osp->smk_out;
+ skp = ssp->smk_in;
+ rc = smk_access(okp, skp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
rc = smk_bu_note("UDS connect", okp, skp,
MAY_WRITE, rc);
}
@@ -3366,7 +3396,9 @@ static int smack_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
int size)
{
struct sockaddr_in *sip = (struct sockaddr_in *) msg->msg_name;
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) && !defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER)
struct sockaddr_in6 *sap = (struct sockaddr_in6 *) msg->msg_name;
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 && !CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER */
int rc = 0;
/*
@@ -3380,7 +3412,9 @@ static int smack_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
rc = smack_netlabel_send(sock->sk, sip);
break;
case AF_INET6:
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) && !defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER)
rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sock->sk, sap, SMK_SENDING);
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 && !CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER */
break;
}
return rc;
@@ -3471,6 +3505,7 @@ static struct smack_known *smack_from_secattr(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap,
return smack_net_ambient;
}
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
static int smk_skb_to_addr_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
{
u8 nexthdr;
@@ -3517,6 +3552,7 @@ static int smk_skb_to_addr_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
}
return proto;
}
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
/**
* smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb - Smack packet delivery access check
@@ -3529,15 +3565,30 @@ static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
- struct smack_known *skp;
- struct sockaddr_in6 sadd;
+ struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
int rc = 0;
struct smk_audit_info ad;
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
struct lsm_network_audit net;
#endif
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+ struct sockaddr_in6 sadd;
+ int proto;
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
+
switch (sk->sk_family) {
case PF_INET:
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
+ /*
+ * If there is a secmark use it rather than the CIPSO label.
+ * If there is no secmark fall back to CIPSO.
+ * The secmark is assumed to reflect policy better.
+ */
+ if (skb && skb->secmark != 0) {
+ skp = smack_from_secid(skb->secmark);
+ goto access_check;
+ }
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER */
/*
* Translate what netlabel gave us.
*/
@@ -3551,6 +3602,9 @@ static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
+access_check:
+#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
ad.a.u.net->family = sk->sk_family;
@@ -3569,14 +3623,32 @@ static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
if (rc != 0)
netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, rc, 0);
break;
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
case PF_INET6:
- rc = smk_skb_to_addr_ipv6(skb, &sadd);
- if (rc == IPPROTO_UDP || rc == IPPROTO_TCP)
- rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sk, &sadd, SMK_RECEIVING);
+ proto = smk_skb_to_addr_ipv6(skb, &sadd);
+ if (proto != IPPROTO_UDP && proto != IPPROTO_TCP)
+ break;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
+ if (skb && skb->secmark != 0)
+ skp = smack_from_secid(skb->secmark);
else
- rc = 0;
+ skp = smack_net_ambient;
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+ smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
+ ad.a.u.net->family = sk->sk_family;
+ ad.a.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
+ ipv6_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL);
+#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+ rc = smk_access(skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+ rc = smk_bu_note("IPv6 delivery", skp, ssp->smk_in,
+ MAY_WRITE, rc);
+#else /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER */
+ rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sk, &sadd, SMK_RECEIVING);
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER */
break;
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
}
+
return rc;
}
@@ -3638,16 +3710,25 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
if (skb != NULL) {
if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
family = PF_INET;
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
else if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
family = PF_INET6;
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
}
if (family == PF_UNSPEC && sock != NULL)
family = sock->sk->sk_family;
- if (family == PF_UNIX) {
+ switch (family) {
+ case PF_UNIX:
ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
s = ssp->smk_out->smk_secid;
- } else if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
+ break;
+ case PF_INET:
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
+ s = skb->secmark;
+ if (s != 0)
+ break;
+#endif
/*
* Translate what netlabel gave us.
*/
@@ -3660,6 +3741,14 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
s = skp->smk_secid;
}
netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
+ break;
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+ case PF_INET6:
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
+ s = skb->secmark;
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER */
+ break;
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
}
*secid = s;
if (s == 0)
@@ -3715,6 +3804,7 @@ static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct lsm_network_audit net;
#endif
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
if (family == PF_INET6) {
/*
* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving
@@ -3726,6 +3816,7 @@ static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
else
return 0;
}
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr);
@@ -3834,11 +3925,11 @@ static void smack_key_free(struct key *key)
key->security = NULL;
}
-/*
+/**
* smack_key_permission - Smack access on a key
* @key_ref: gets to the object
* @cred: the credentials to use
- * @perm: unused
+ * @perm: requested key permissions
*
* Return 0 if the task has read and write to the object,
* an error code otherwise
@@ -4184,7 +4275,9 @@ struct security_operations smack_ops = {
.unix_may_send = smack_unix_may_send,
.socket_post_create = smack_socket_post_create,
+#ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
.socket_bind = smack_socket_bind,
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER */
.socket_connect = smack_socket_connect,
.socket_sendmsg = smack_socket_sendmsg,
.socket_sock_rcv_skb = smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
@@ -4265,6 +4358,8 @@ static __init int smack_init(void)
if (!security_module_enable(&smack_ops))
return 0;
+ smack_enabled = 1;
+
smack_inode_cache = KMEM_CACHE(inode_smack, 0);
if (!smack_inode_cache)
return -ENOMEM;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c b/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..c952632afb0d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+/*
+ * Simplified MAC Kernel (smack) security module
+ *
+ * This file contains the Smack netfilter implementation
+ *
+ * Author:
+ * Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2014 Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
+ * Copyright (C) 2014 Intel Corporation.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
+#include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
+#include <linux/netdevice.h>
+#include "smack.h"
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+
+static unsigned int smack_ipv6_output(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops,
+ struct sk_buff *skb,
+ const struct net_device *in,
+ const struct net_device *out,
+ int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
+{
+ struct socket_smack *ssp;
+ struct smack_known *skp;
+
+ if (skb && skb->sk && skb->sk->sk_security) {
+ ssp = skb->sk->sk_security;
+ skp = ssp->smk_out;
+ skb->secmark = skp->smk_secid;
+ }
+
+ return NF_ACCEPT;
+}
+#endif /* IPV6 */
+
+static unsigned int smack_ipv4_output(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops,
+ struct sk_buff *skb,
+ const struct net_device *in,
+ const struct net_device *out,
+ int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
+{
+ struct socket_smack *ssp;
+ struct smack_known *skp;
+
+ if (skb && skb->sk && skb->sk->sk_security) {
+ ssp = skb->sk->sk_security;
+ skp = ssp->smk_out;
+ skb->secmark = skp->smk_secid;
+ }
+
+ return NF_ACCEPT;
+}
+
+static struct nf_hook_ops smack_nf_ops[] = {
+ {
+ .hook = smack_ipv4_output,
+ .owner = THIS_MODULE,
+ .pf = NFPROTO_IPV4,
+ .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
+ .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
+ },
+#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+ {
+ .hook = smack_ipv6_output,
+ .owner = THIS_MODULE,
+ .pf = NFPROTO_IPV6,
+ .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
+ .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
+ },
+#endif /* IPV6 */
+};
+
+static int __init smack_nf_ip_init(void)
+{
+ int err;
+
+ if (smack_enabled == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ printk(KERN_DEBUG "Smack: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
+
+ err = nf_register_hooks(smack_nf_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(smack_nf_ops));
+ if (err)
+ pr_info("Smack: nf_register_hooks: error %d\n", err);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+__initcall(smack_nf_ip_init);

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