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-rw-r--r--Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt4
-rw-r--r--Documentation/security/IMA-templates.txt29
-rw-r--r--fs/read_write.c24
-rw-r--r--include/linux/fs.h1
-rw-r--r--include/linux/integrity.h6
-rw-r--r--init/main.c6
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/digsig.c38
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c11
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/iint.c88
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/Kconfig25
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c7
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c35
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c37
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c17
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c5
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c42
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c103
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/integrity.h19
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c2
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smack_access.c17
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smack_lsm.c13
21 files changed, 374 insertions, 155 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
index 4a337daf0c09..1de833556d22 100644
--- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -1376,6 +1376,10 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted.
Formats: { "ima" | "ima-ng" }
Default: "ima-ng"
+ ima_template_fmt=
+ [IMA] Define a custom template format.
+ Format: { "field1|...|fieldN" }
+
ima.ahash_minsize= [IMA] Minimum file size for asynchronous hash usage
Format: <min_file_size>
Set the minimal file size for using asynchronous hash.
diff --git a/Documentation/security/IMA-templates.txt b/Documentation/security/IMA-templates.txt
index a4e102dddfea..839b5dad9226 100644
--- a/Documentation/security/IMA-templates.txt
+++ b/Documentation/security/IMA-templates.txt
@@ -27,25 +27,22 @@ Managing templates with these structures is very simple. To support
a new data type, developers define the field identifier and implement
two functions, init() and show(), respectively to generate and display
measurement entries. Defining a new template descriptor requires
-specifying the template format, a string of field identifiers separated
-by the '|' character. While in the current implementation it is possible
-to define new template descriptors only by adding their definition in the
-template specific code (ima_template.c), in a future version it will be
-possible to register a new template on a running kernel by supplying to IMA
-the desired format string. In this version, IMA initializes at boot time
-all defined template descriptors by translating the format into an array
-of template fields structures taken from the set of the supported ones.
+specifying the template format (a string of field identifiers separated
+by the '|' character) through the 'ima_template_fmt' kernel command line
+parameter. At boot time, IMA initializes the chosen template descriptor
+by translating the format into an array of template fields structures taken
+from the set of the supported ones.
After the initialization step, IMA will call ima_alloc_init_template()
(new function defined within the patches for the new template management
mechanism) to generate a new measurement entry by using the template
descriptor chosen through the kernel configuration or through the newly
-introduced 'ima_template=' kernel command line parameter. It is during this
-phase that the advantages of the new architecture are clearly shown:
-the latter function will not contain specific code to handle a given template
-but, instead, it simply calls the init() method of the template fields
-associated to the chosen template descriptor and store the result (pointer
-to allocated data and data length) in the measurement entry structure.
+introduced 'ima_template' and 'ima_template_fmt' kernel command line parameters.
+It is during this phase that the advantages of the new architecture are
+clearly shown: the latter function will not contain specific code to handle
+a given template but, instead, it simply calls the init() method of the template
+fields associated to the chosen template descriptor and store the result
+(pointer to allocated data and data length) in the measurement entry structure.
The same mechanism is employed to display measurements entries.
The functions ima[_ascii]_measurements_show() retrieve, for each entry,
@@ -86,4 +83,6 @@ currently the following methods are supported:
- select a template descriptor among those supported in the kernel
configuration ('ima-ng' is the default choice);
- specify a template descriptor name from the kernel command line through
- the 'ima_template=' parameter.
+ the 'ima_template=' parameter;
+ - register a new template descriptor with custom format through the kernel
+ command line parameter 'ima_template_fmt='.
diff --git a/fs/read_write.c b/fs/read_write.c
index 7d9318c3d43c..c0805c93b6fa 100644
--- a/fs/read_write.c
+++ b/fs/read_write.c
@@ -412,6 +412,23 @@ ssize_t new_sync_read(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, size_t len, loff_t *p
EXPORT_SYMBOL(new_sync_read);
+ssize_t __vfs_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count,
+ loff_t *pos)
+{
+ ssize_t ret;
+
+ if (file->f_op->read)
+ ret = file->f_op->read(file, buf, count, pos);
+ else if (file->f_op->aio_read)
+ ret = do_sync_read(file, buf, count, pos);
+ else if (file->f_op->read_iter)
+ ret = new_sync_read(file, buf, count, pos);
+ else
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
ssize_t vfs_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *pos)
{
ssize_t ret;
@@ -426,12 +443,7 @@ ssize_t vfs_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *pos)
ret = rw_verify_area(READ, file, pos, count);
if (ret >= 0) {
count = ret;
- if (file->f_op->read)
- ret = file->f_op->read(file, buf, count, pos);
- else if (file->f_op->aio_read)
- ret = do_sync_read(file, buf, count, pos);
- else
- ret = new_sync_read(file, buf, count, pos);
+ ret = __vfs_read(file, buf, count, pos);
if (ret > 0) {
fsnotify_access(file);
add_rchar(current, ret);
diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
index 8f7fc8db4679..88157253b9e6 100644
--- a/include/linux/fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/fs.h
@@ -1582,6 +1582,7 @@ ssize_t rw_copy_check_uvector(int type, const struct iovec __user * uvector,
struct iovec *fast_pointer,
struct iovec **ret_pointer);
+extern ssize_t __vfs_read(struct file *, char __user *, size_t, loff_t *);
extern ssize_t vfs_read(struct file *, char __user *, size_t, loff_t *);
extern ssize_t vfs_write(struct file *, const char __user *, size_t, loff_t *);
extern ssize_t vfs_readv(struct file *, const struct iovec __user *,
diff --git a/include/linux/integrity.h b/include/linux/integrity.h
index 83222cebd47b..c2d6082a1a4c 100644
--- a/include/linux/integrity.h
+++ b/include/linux/integrity.h
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ enum integrity_status {
#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY
extern struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_inode_get(struct inode *inode);
extern void integrity_inode_free(struct inode *inode);
+extern void __init integrity_load_keys(void);
#else
static inline struct integrity_iint_cache *
@@ -36,5 +37,10 @@ static inline void integrity_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
{
return;
}
+
+static inline void integrity_load_keys(void)
+{
+}
#endif /* CONFIG_INTEGRITY */
+
#endif /* _LINUX_INTEGRITY_H */
diff --git a/init/main.c b/init/main.c
index ed7e7ad5fee0..8a914b758e5d 100644
--- a/init/main.c
+++ b/init/main.c
@@ -78,6 +78,7 @@
#include <linux/context_tracking.h>
#include <linux/random.h>
#include <linux/list.h>
+#include <linux/integrity.h>
#include <asm/io.h>
#include <asm/bugs.h>
@@ -1031,8 +1032,11 @@ static noinline void __init kernel_init_freeable(void)
* Ok, we have completed the initial bootup, and
* we're essentially up and running. Get rid of the
* initmem segments and start the user-mode stuff..
+ *
+ * rootfs is available now, try loading the public keys
+ * and default modules
*/
- /* rootfs is available now, try loading default modules */
+ integrity_load_keys();
load_default_modules();
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c
index 8d4fbff8b87c..5e3bd72b299a 100644
--- a/security/integrity/digsig.c
+++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
-#include <linux/rbtree.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/cred.h>
#include <linux/key-type.h>
#include <linux/digsig.h>
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
-int integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id)
+int __init integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
int err = 0;
@@ -84,3 +84,37 @@ int integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id)
}
return err;
}
+
+int __init integrity_load_x509(const unsigned int id, char *path)
+{
+ key_ref_t key;
+ char *data;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (!keyring[id])
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ rc = integrity_read_file(path, &data);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ return rc;
+
+ key = key_create_or_update(make_key_ref(keyring[id], 1),
+ "asymmetric",
+ NULL,
+ data,
+ rc,
+ ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
+ KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ),
+ KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA | KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED);
+ if (IS_ERR(key)) {
+ rc = PTR_ERR(key);
+ pr_err("Problem loading X.509 certificate (%d): %s\n",
+ rc, path);
+ } else {
+ pr_notice("Loaded X.509 cert '%s': %s\n",
+ key_ref_to_ptr(key)->description, path);
+ key_ref_put(key);
+ }
+ kfree(data);
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index c5ee1a7c5e8a..f589c9a05da2 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -162,9 +162,14 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry,
(const char *)xattr_data, xattr_len,
calc.digest, sizeof(calc.digest));
if (!rc) {
- /* we probably want to replace rsa with hmac here */
- evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
- xattr_value_len);
+ /* Replace RSA with HMAC if not mounted readonly and
+ * not immutable
+ */
+ if (!IS_RDONLY(dentry->d_inode) &&
+ !IS_IMMUTABLE(dentry->d_inode))
+ evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name,
+ xattr_value,
+ xattr_value_len);
}
break;
default:
diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c
index a521edf4cbd6..dbb6d141c3db 100644
--- a/security/integrity/iint.c
+++ b/security/integrity/iint.c
@@ -19,14 +19,14 @@
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/spinlock.h>
#include <linux/rbtree.h>
+#include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include "integrity.h"
static struct rb_root integrity_iint_tree = RB_ROOT;
static DEFINE_RWLOCK(integrity_iint_lock);
static struct kmem_cache *iint_cache __read_mostly;
-int iint_initialized;
-
/*
* __integrity_iint_find - return the iint associated with an inode
*/
@@ -166,7 +166,89 @@ static int __init integrity_iintcache_init(void)
iint_cache =
kmem_cache_create("iint_cache", sizeof(struct integrity_iint_cache),
0, SLAB_PANIC, init_once);
- iint_initialized = 1;
return 0;
}
security_initcall(integrity_iintcache_init);
+
+
+/*
+ * integrity_kernel_read - read data from the file
+ *
+ * This is a function for reading file content instead of kernel_read().
+ * It does not perform locking checks to ensure it cannot be blocked.
+ * It does not perform security checks because it is irrelevant for IMA.
+ *
+ */
+int integrity_kernel_read(struct file *file, loff_t offset,
+ char *addr, unsigned long count)
+{
+ mm_segment_t old_fs;
+ char __user *buf = (char __user *)addr;
+ ssize_t ret;
+
+ if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_READ))
+ return -EBADF;
+
+ old_fs = get_fs();
+ set_fs(get_ds());
+ ret = __vfs_read(file, buf, count, &offset);
+ set_fs(old_fs);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * integrity_read_file - read entire file content into the buffer
+ *
+ * This is function opens a file, allocates the buffer of required
+ * size, read entire file content to the buffer and closes the file
+ *
+ * It is used only by init code.
+ *
+ */
+int __init integrity_read_file(const char *path, char **data)
+{
+ struct file *file;
+ loff_t size;
+ char *buf;
+ int rc = -EINVAL;
+
+ file = filp_open(path, O_RDONLY, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(file)) {
+ rc = PTR_ERR(file);
+ pr_err("Unable to open file: %s (%d)", path, rc);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ size = i_size_read(file_inode(file));
+ if (size <= 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ buf = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!buf) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ rc = integrity_kernel_read(file, 0, buf, size);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ kfree(buf);
+ else if (rc != size)
+ rc = -EIO;
+ else
+ *data = buf;
+out:
+ fput(file);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * integrity_load_keys - load integrity keys hook
+ *
+ * Hooks is called from init/main.c:kernel_init_freeable()
+ * when rootfs is ready
+ */
+void __init integrity_load_keys(void)
+{
+ ima_load_x509();
+}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
index e099875643c5..b80a93ec1ccc 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
@@ -131,3 +131,28 @@ config IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING
help
This option requires that all keys added to the .ima
keyring be signed by a key on the system trusted keyring.
+
+config IMA_LOAD_X509
+ bool "Load X509 certificate onto the '.ima' trusted keyring"
+ depends on IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+ default n
+ help
+ File signature verification is based on the public keys
+ loaded on the .ima trusted keyring. These public keys are
+ X509 certificates signed by a trusted key on the
+ .system keyring. This option enables X509 certificate
+ loading from the kernel onto the '.ima' trusted keyring.
+
+config IMA_X509_PATH
+ string "IMA X509 certificate path"
+ depends on IMA_LOAD_X509
+ default "/etc/keys/x509_ima.der"
+ help
+ This option defines IMA X509 certificate path.
+
+config IMA_APPRAISE_SIGNED_INIT
+ bool "Require signed user-space initialization"
+ depends on IMA_LOAD_X509
+ default n
+ help
+ This option requires user-space init to be signed.
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index f92be1b14089..b8a27c5052d4 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -173,8 +173,7 @@ int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, int mask, int function)
{
int flags = IMA_MEASURE | IMA_AUDIT | IMA_APPRAISE;
- if (!ima_appraise)
- flags &= ~IMA_APPRAISE;
+ flags &= ima_policy_flag;
return ima_match_policy(inode, function, mask, flags);
}
@@ -325,11 +324,11 @@ const char *ima_d_path(struct path *path, char **pathbuf)
{
char *pathname = NULL;
- *pathbuf = kmalloc(PATH_MAX, GFP_KERNEL);
+ *pathbuf = __getname();
if (*pathbuf) {
pathname = d_absolute_path(path, *pathbuf, PATH_MAX);
if (IS_ERR(pathname)) {
- kfree(*pathbuf);
+ __putname(*pathbuf);
*pathbuf = NULL;
pathname = NULL;
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
index 78d66dae15f4..686355fea7fd 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
@@ -67,36 +67,6 @@ MODULE_PARM_DESC(ahash_bufsize, "Maximum ahash buffer size");
static struct crypto_shash *ima_shash_tfm;
static struct crypto_ahash *ima_ahash_tfm;
-/**
- * ima_kernel_read - read file content
- *
- * This is a function for reading file content instead of kernel_read().
- * It does not perform locking checks to ensure it cannot be blocked.
- * It does not perform security checks because it is irrelevant for IMA.
- *
- */
-static int ima_kernel_read(struct file *file, loff_t offset,
- char *addr, unsigned long count)
-{
- mm_segment_t old_fs;
- char __user *buf = addr;
- ssize_t ret = -EINVAL;
-
- if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_READ))
- return -EBADF;
-
- old_fs = get_fs();
- set_fs(get_ds());
- if (file->f_op->read)
- ret = file->f_op->read(file, buf, count, &offset);
- else if (file->f_op->aio_read)
- ret = do_sync_read(file, buf, count, &offset);
- else if (file->f_op->read_iter)
- ret = new_sync_read(file, buf, count, &offset);
- set_fs(old_fs);
- return ret;
-}
-
int __init ima_init_crypto(void)
{
long rc;
@@ -324,7 +294,8 @@ static int ima_calc_file_hash_atfm(struct file *file,
}
/* read buffer */
rbuf_len = min_t(loff_t, i_size - offset, rbuf_size[active]);
- rc = ima_kernel_read(file, offset, rbuf[active], rbuf_len);
+ rc = integrity_kernel_read(file, offset, rbuf[active],
+ rbuf_len);
if (rc != rbuf_len)
goto out3;
@@ -414,7 +385,7 @@ static int ima_calc_file_hash_tfm(struct file *file,
while (offset < i_size) {
int rbuf_len;
- rbuf_len = ima_kernel_read(file, offset, rbuf, PAGE_SIZE);
+ rbuf_len = integrity_kernel_read(file, offset, rbuf, PAGE_SIZE);
if (rbuf_len < 0) {
rc = rbuf_len;
break;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
index da92fcc08d15..461215e5fd31 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
@@ -118,6 +118,7 @@ static int ima_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
/* the list never shrinks, so we don't need a lock here */
struct ima_queue_entry *qe = v;
struct ima_template_entry *e;
+ char *template_name;
int namelen;
u32 pcr = CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX;
bool is_ima_template = false;
@@ -128,6 +129,9 @@ static int ima_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
if (e == NULL)
return -1;
+ template_name = (e->template_desc->name[0] != '\0') ?
+ e->template_desc->name : e->template_desc->fmt;
+
/*
* 1st: PCRIndex
* PCR used is always the same (config option) in
@@ -139,14 +143,14 @@ static int ima_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
ima_putc(m, e->digest, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
/* 3rd: template name size */
- namelen = strlen(e->template_desc->name);
+ namelen = strlen(template_name);
ima_putc(m, &namelen, sizeof(namelen));
/* 4th: template name */
- ima_putc(m, e->template_desc->name, namelen);
+ ima_putc(m, template_name, namelen);
/* 5th: template length (except for 'ima' template) */
- if (strcmp(e->template_desc->name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) == 0)
+ if (strcmp(template_name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) == 0)
is_ima_template = true;
if (!is_ima_template)
@@ -200,6 +204,7 @@ static int ima_ascii_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
/* the list never shrinks, so we don't need a lock here */
struct ima_queue_entry *qe = v;
struct ima_template_entry *e;
+ char *template_name;
int i;
/* get entry */
@@ -207,6 +212,9 @@ static int ima_ascii_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
if (e == NULL)
return -1;
+ template_name = (e->template_desc->name[0] != '\0') ?
+ e->template_desc->name : e->template_desc->fmt;
+
/* 1st: PCR used (config option) */
seq_printf(m, "%2d ", CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX);
@@ -214,7 +222,7 @@ static int ima_ascii_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
ima_print_digest(m, e->digest, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
/* 3th: template name */
- seq_printf(m, " %s", e->template_desc->name);
+ seq_printf(m, " %s", template_name);
/* 4th: template specific data */
for (i = 0; i < e->template_desc->num_fields; i++) {
@@ -288,7 +296,12 @@ static struct dentry *runtime_measurements_count;
static struct dentry *violations;
static struct dentry *ima_policy;
-static atomic_t policy_opencount = ATOMIC_INIT(1);
+enum ima_fs_flags {
+ IMA_FS_BUSY,
+};
+
+static unsigned long ima_fs_flags;
+
/*
* ima_open_policy: sequentialize access to the policy file
*/
@@ -297,9 +310,9 @@ static int ima_open_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
/* No point in being allowed to open it if you aren't going to write */
if (!(filp->f_flags & O_WRONLY))
return -EACCES;
- if (atomic_dec_and_test(&policy_opencount))
- return 0;
- return -EBUSY;
+ if (test_and_set_bit(IMA_FS_BUSY, &ima_fs_flags))
+ return -EBUSY;
+ return 0;
}
/*
@@ -311,10 +324,16 @@ static int ima_open_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
*/
static int ima_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
+ const char *cause = valid_policy ? "completed" : "failed";
+
+ pr_info("IMA: policy update %s\n", cause);
+ integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL, NULL,
+ "policy_update", cause, !valid_policy, 0);
+
if (!valid_policy) {
ima_delete_rules();
valid_policy = 1;
- atomic_set(&policy_opencount, 1);
+ clear_bit(IMA_FS_BUSY, &ima_fs_flags);
return 0;
}
ima_update_policy();
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
index 9164fc8cac84..5e4c29d174ee 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
@@ -24,6 +24,12 @@
#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
#include "ima.h"
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_X509_PATH
+#define IMA_X509_PATH CONFIG_IMA_X509_PATH
+#else
+#define IMA_X509_PATH "/etc/keys/x509_ima.der"
+#endif
+
/* name for boot aggregate entry */
static const char *boot_aggregate_name = "boot_aggregate";
int ima_used_chip;
@@ -91,6 +97,17 @@ err_out:
return result;
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LOAD_X509
+void __init ima_load_x509(void)
+{
+ int unset_flags = ima_policy_flag & IMA_APPRAISE;
+
+ ima_policy_flag &= ~unset_flags;
+ integrity_load_x509(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA, IMA_X509_PATH);
+ ima_policy_flag |= unset_flags;
+}
+#endif
+
int __init ima_init(void)
{
u8 pcr_i[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 62f59eca32d3..eeee00dce729 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
- if (!iint_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
+ if (!ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
return;
iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
@@ -246,7 +246,8 @@ out_digsig:
rc = -EACCES;
kfree(xattr_value);
out_free:
- kfree(pathbuf);
+ if (pathbuf)
+ __putname(pathbuf);
out:
mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
if ((rc && must_appraise) && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE))
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index cdc620b2152f..d1eefb9d65fb 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -100,7 +100,13 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry default_appraise_rules[] = {
{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+#ifndef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_SIGNED_INIT
{.action = APPRAISE, .fowner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .flags = IMA_FOWNER},
+#else
+ /* force signature */
+ {.action = APPRAISE, .fowner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
+ .flags = IMA_FOWNER | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED},
+#endif
};
static LIST_HEAD(ima_default_rules);
@@ -356,19 +362,8 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void)
*/
void ima_update_policy(void)
{
- static const char op[] = "policy_update";
- const char *cause = "already-exists";
- int result = 1;
- int audit_info = 0;
-
- if (ima_rules == &ima_default_rules) {
- ima_rules = &ima_policy_rules;
- ima_update_policy_flag();
- cause = "complete";
- result = 0;
- }
- integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL,
- NULL, op, cause, result, audit_info);
+ ima_rules = &ima_policy_rules;
+ ima_update_policy_flag();
}
enum {
@@ -686,13 +681,12 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
ssize_t result, len;
int audit_info = 0;
- /* Prevent installed policy from changing */
- if (ima_rules != &ima_default_rules) {
- integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL,
- NULL, op, "already-exists",
- -EACCES, audit_info);
- return -EACCES;
- }
+ p = strsep(&rule, "\n");
+ len = strlen(p) + 1;
+ p += strspn(p, " \t");
+
+ if (*p == '#' || *p == '\0')
+ return len;
entry = kzalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!entry) {
@@ -703,14 +697,6 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&entry->list);
- p = strsep(&rule, "\n");
- len = strlen(p) + 1;
-
- if (*p == '#') {
- kfree(entry);
- return len;
- }
-
result = ima_parse_rule(p, entry);
if (result) {
kfree(entry);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
index e854862c9337..0b7404ebfa80 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ static struct ima_template_desc defined_templates[] = {
{.name = IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME, .fmt = IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_FMT},
{.name = "ima-ng", .fmt = "d-ng|n-ng"},
{.name = "ima-sig", .fmt = "d-ng|n-ng|sig"},
+ {.name = "", .fmt = ""}, /* placeholder for a custom format */
};
static struct ima_template_field supported_fields[] = {
@@ -41,19 +42,28 @@ static struct ima_template_field supported_fields[] = {
static struct ima_template_desc *ima_template;
static struct ima_template_desc *lookup_template_desc(const char *name);
+static int template_desc_init_fields(const char *template_fmt,
+ struct ima_template_field ***fields,
+ int *num_fields);
static int __init ima_template_setup(char *str)
{
struct ima_template_desc *template_desc;
int template_len = strlen(str);
+ if (ima_template)
+ return 1;
+
/*
* Verify that a template with the supplied name exists.
* If not, use CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_TEMPLATE.
*/
template_desc = lookup_template_desc(str);
- if (!template_desc)
+ if (!template_desc) {
+ pr_err("template %s not found, using %s\n",
+ str, CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_TEMPLATE);
return 1;
+ }
/*
* Verify whether the current hash algorithm is supported
@@ -70,6 +80,25 @@ static int __init ima_template_setup(char *str)
}
__setup("ima_template=", ima_template_setup);
+static int __init ima_template_fmt_setup(char *str)
+{
+ int num_templates = ARRAY_SIZE(defined_templates);
+
+ if (ima_template)
+ return 1;
+
+ if (template_desc_init_fields(str, NULL, NULL) < 0) {
+ pr_err("format string '%s' not valid, using template %s\n",
+ str, CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_TEMPLATE);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ defined_templates[num_templates - 1].fmt = str;
+ ima_template = defined_templates + num_templates - 1;
+ return 1;
+}
+__setup("ima_template_fmt=", ima_template_fmt_setup);
+
static struct ima_template_desc *lookup_template_desc(const char *name)
{
int i;
@@ -113,43 +142,46 @@ static int template_desc_init_fields(const char *template_fmt,
struct ima_template_field ***fields,
int *num_fields)
{
- char *c, *template_fmt_copy, *template_fmt_ptr;
+ const char *template_fmt_ptr;
+ struct ima_template_field *found_fields[IMA_TEMPLATE_NUM_FIELDS_MAX];
int template_num_fields = template_fmt_size(template_fmt);
- int i, result = 0;
+ int i, len;
- if (template_num_fields > IMA_TEMPLATE_NUM_FIELDS_MAX)
+ if (template_num_fields > IMA_TEMPLATE_NUM_FIELDS_MAX) {
+ pr_err("format string '%s' contains too many fields\n",
+ template_fmt);
return -EINVAL;
-
- /* copying is needed as strsep() modifies the original buffer */
- template_fmt_copy = kstrdup(template_fmt, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (template_fmt_copy == NULL)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- *fields = kzalloc(template_num_fields * sizeof(*fields), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (*fields == NULL) {
- result = -ENOMEM;
- goto out;
}
- template_fmt_ptr = template_fmt_copy;
- for (i = 0; (c = strsep(&template_fmt_ptr, "|")) != NULL &&
- i < template_num_fields; i++) {
- struct ima_template_field *f = lookup_template_field(c);
+ for (i = 0, template_fmt_ptr = template_fmt; i < template_num_fields;
+ i++, template_fmt_ptr += len + 1) {
+ char tmp_field_id[IMA_TEMPLATE_FIELD_ID_MAX_LEN + 1];
+
+ len = strchrnul(template_fmt_ptr, '|') - template_fmt_ptr;
+ if (len == 0 || len > IMA_TEMPLATE_FIELD_ID_MAX_LEN) {
+ pr_err("Invalid field with length %d\n", len);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
- if (!f) {
- result = -ENOENT;
- goto out;
+ memcpy(tmp_field_id, template_fmt_ptr, len);
+ tmp_field_id[len] = '\0';
+ found_fields[i] = lookup_template_field(tmp_field_id);
+ if (!found_fields[i]) {
+ pr_err("field '%s' not found\n", tmp_field_id);
+ return -ENOENT;
}
- (*fields)[i] = f;
}
- *num_fields = i;
-out:
- if (result < 0) {
- kfree(*fields);
- *fields = NULL;
+
+ if (fields && num_fields) {
+ *fields = kmalloc_array(i, sizeof(*fields), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (*fields == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ memcpy(*fields, found_fields, i * sizeof(*fields));
+ *num_fields = i;
}
- kfree(template_fmt_copy);
- return result;
+
+ return 0;
}
struct ima_template_desc *ima_template_desc_current(void)
@@ -163,8 +195,15 @@ struct ima_template_desc *ima_template_desc_current(void)
int __init ima_init_template(void)
{
struct ima_template_desc *template = ima_template_desc_current();
+ int result;
+
+ result = template_desc_init_fields(template->fmt,
+ &(template->fields),
+ &(template->num_fields));
+ if (result < 0)
+ pr_err("template %s init failed, result: %d\n",
+ (strlen(template->name) ?
+ template->name : template->fmt), result);
- return template_desc_init_fields(template->fmt,
- &(template->fields),
- &(template->num_fields));
+ return result;
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index 9d1c2ebfe12a..0fc9519fefa9 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -120,6 +120,10 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache {
*/
struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_find(struct inode *inode);
+int integrity_kernel_read(struct file *file, loff_t offset,
+ char *addr, unsigned long count);
+int __init integrity_read_file(const char *path, char **data);
+
#define INTEGRITY_KEYRING_EVM 0
#define INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MODULE 1
#define INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA 2
@@ -130,7 +134,8 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_find(struct inode *inode);
int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
const char *digest, int digestlen);
-int integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id);
+int __init integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id);
+int __init integrity_load_x509(const unsigned int id, char *path);
#else
static inline int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id,
@@ -144,6 +149,7 @@ static inline int integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id)
{
return 0;
}
+
#endif /* CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE */
#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
@@ -157,6 +163,14 @@ static inline int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig,
}
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LOAD_X509
+void __init ima_load_x509(void);
+#else
+static inline void ima_load_x509(void)
+{
+}
+#endif
+
#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_AUDIT
/* declarations */
void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
@@ -170,6 +184,3 @@ static inline void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
{
}
#endif
-
-/* set during initialization */
-extern int iint_initialized;
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index c603b20356ad..6da7532893a1 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -95,8 +95,6 @@
#include "audit.h"
#include "avc_ss.h"
-extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
-
/* SECMARK reference count */
static atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c
index 5b970ffde024..1158430f5bb9 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_access.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c
@@ -142,8 +142,7 @@ int smk_access(struct smack_known *subject, struct smack_known *object,
* Tasks cannot be assigned the internet label.
* An internet subject can access any object.
*/
- if (object == &smack_known_web ||
- subject == &smack_known_web)
+ if (object == &smack_known_web || subject == &smack_known_web)
goto out_audit;
/*
* A star object can be accessed by any subject.
@@ -157,10 +156,11 @@ int smk_access(struct smack_known *subject, struct smack_known *object,
if (subject->smk_known == object->smk_known)
goto out_audit;
/*
- * A hat subject can read any object.
- * A floor object can be read by any subject.
+ * A hat subject can read or lock any object.
+ * A floor object can be read or locked by any subject.
*/
- if ((request & MAY_ANYREAD) == request) {
+ if ((request & MAY_ANYREAD) == request ||
+ (request & MAY_LOCK) == request) {
if (object == &smack_known_floor)
goto out_audit;
if (subject == &smack_known_hat)
@@ -452,10 +452,9 @@ char *smk_parse_smack(const char *string, int len)
return NULL;
smack = kzalloc(i + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (smack != NULL) {
- strncpy(smack, string, i + 1);
- smack[i] = '\0';
- }
+ if (smack != NULL)
+ strncpy(smack, string, i);
+
return smack;
}
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 433ae61e7f42..f1b17a476e12 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@
#define SMK_SENDING 2
LIST_HEAD(smk_ipv6_port_list);
+static struct kmem_cache *smack_inode_cache;
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
static void smk_bu_mode(int mode, char *s)
@@ -240,7 +241,7 @@ struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(struct smack_known *skp)
{
struct inode_smack *isp;
- isp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct inode_smack), GFP_NOFS);
+ isp = kmem_cache_zalloc(smack_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
if (isp == NULL)
return NULL;
@@ -767,7 +768,7 @@ static int smack_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
*/
static void smack_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
{
- kfree(inode->i_security);
+ kmem_cache_free(smack_inode_cache, inode->i_security);
inode->i_security = NULL;
}
@@ -4264,10 +4265,16 @@ static __init int smack_init(void)
if (!security_module_enable(&smack_ops))
return 0;
+ smack_inode_cache = KMEM_CACHE(inode_smack, 0);
+ if (!smack_inode_cache)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
tsp = new_task_smack(&smack_known_floor, &smack_known_floor,
GFP_KERNEL);
- if (tsp == NULL)
+ if (tsp == NULL) {
+ kmem_cache_destroy(smack_inode_cache);
return -ENOMEM;
+ }
printk(KERN_INFO "Smack: Initializing.\n");

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