path: root/security/selinux/hooks.c
diff options
authorPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>2014-05-15 11:16:06 -0400
committerSerge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>2014-06-03 14:21:48 -0500
commit5b589d44fad18228f18749360d008d5c8ff3aaf8 (patch)
treecc90b51e698724cb18b113904a629625ba79185f /security/selinux/hooks.c
parentca7786a2f916540931d7114d441efa141c99c898 (diff)
selinux: reject setexeccon() on MNT_NOSUID applications with -EACCES
We presently prevent processes from using setexecon() to set the security label of exec()'d processes when NO_NEW_PRIVS is enabled by returning an error; however, we silently ignore setexeccon() when exec()'ing from a nosuid mounted filesystem. This patch makes things a bit more consistent by returning an error in the setexeccon()/nosuid case. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/selinux/hooks.c')
1 files changed, 4 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index d3a2c2e80fec..d4cbf7d16f07 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -2123,11 +2123,13 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
- * Minimize confusion: if no_new_privs and a transition is
- * explicitly requested, then fail the exec.
+ * Minimize confusion: if no_new_privs or nosuid and a
+ * transition is explicitly requested, then fail the exec.
if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS)
return -EPERM;
+ if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
+ return -EACCES;
} else {
/* Check for a default transition on this program. */
rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,

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