aboutsummaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/security/selinux/include
AgeCommit message (Collapse)AuthorFilesLines
2005-06-25[PATCH] selinux: add executable heap checkLorenzo Hernández García-Hierro2-0/+2
This patch,based on sample code by Roland McGrath, adds an execheap permission check that controls the ability to make the heap executable so that this can be prevented in almost all cases (the X server is presently an exception, but this will hopefully be resolved in the future) so that even programs with execmem permission will need to have the anonymous memory mapped in order to make it executable. The only reason that we use a permission check for such restriction (vs. making it unconditional) is that the X module loader presently needs it; it could possibly be made unconditional in the future when X is changed. The policy patch for the execheap permission is available at: http://pearls.tuxedo-es.org/patches/selinux/policy-execheap.patch Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Hernandez Garcia-Hierro <lorenzo@gnu.org> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-25[PATCH] selinux: add executable stack checkLorenzo Hernandez García-Hierro2-0/+2
This patch adds an execstack permission check that controls the ability to make the main process stack executable so that attempts to make the stack executable can still be prevented even if the process is allowed the existing execmem permission in order to e.g. perform runtime code generation. Note that this does not yet address thread stacks. Note also that unlike the execmem check, the execstack check is only applied on mprotect calls, not mmap calls, as the current security_file_mmap hook is not passed the necessary information presently. The original author of the code that makes the distinction of the stack region, is Ingo Molnar, who wrote it within his patch for /proc/<pid>/maps markers. (http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=linux-kernel&m=110719881508591&w=2) The patches also can be found at: http://pearls.tuxedo-es.org/patches/selinux/policy-execstack.patch http://pearls.tuxedo-es.org/patches/selinux/kernel-execstack.patch policy-execstack.patch is the patch that needs to be applied to the policy in order to support the execstack permission and exclude it from general_domain_access within macros/core_macros.te. kernel-execstack.patch adds such permission to the SELinux code within the kernel and adds the proper permission check to the selinux_file_mprotect() hook. Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Hernandez Garcia-Hierro <lorenzo@gnu.org> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-05-01[PATCH] SELinux: add finer grained permissions to Netlink audit processingJames Morris2-0/+4
This patch provides finer grained permissions for the audit family of Netlink sockets under SELinux. 1. We need a way to differentiate between privileged and unprivileged reads of kernel data maintained by the audit subsystem. The AUDIT_GET operation is unprivileged: it returns the current status of the audit subsystem (e.g. whether it's enabled etc.). The AUDIT_LIST operation however returns a list of the current audit ruleset, which is considered privileged by the audit folk. To deal with this, a new SELinux permission has been implemented and applied to the operation: nlmsg_readpriv, which can be allocated to appropriately privileged domains. Unprivileged domains would only be allocated nlmsg_read. 2. There is a requirement for certain domains to generate audit events from userspace. These events need to be collected by the kernel, collated and transmitted sequentially back to the audit daemon. An example is user level login, an auditable event under CAPP, where login-related domains generate AUDIT_USER messages via PAM which are relayed back to auditd via the kernel. To prevent handing out nlmsg_write permissions to such domains, a new permission has been added, nlmsg_relay, which is intended for this type of purpose: data is passed via the kernel back to userspace but no privileged information is written to the kernel. Also, AUDIT_LOGIN messages are now valid only for kernel->user messaging, so this value has been removed from the SELinux nlmsgtab (which is only used to check user->kernel messages). Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-04-16[PATCH] SELinux: add support for NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENTJames Morris5-0/+37
This patch adds SELinux support for the KOBJECT_UEVENT Netlink family, so that SELinux can apply finer grained controls to it. For example, security policy for hald can be locked down to the KOBJECT_UEVENT Netlink family only. Currently, this family simply defaults to the default Netlink socket class. Note that some new permission definitions are added to sync with changes in the core userspace policy package, which auto-generates header files. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-04-16Linux-2.6.12-rc2Linus Torvalds13-0/+1811
Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!

Privacy Policy